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Abstract: 
The territorial dispute between Japan and China over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is framed by 
economic interests, domestic circumstances, national identity issues, requirements of international law and historical 
grievances. The article provides an analysis of these issues which are indicative of the bilateral relationship in 
general. The analysis of the 1972-2010 period traces the reasons for the erosion of the implicit agreement in 1972 
and 1978 between the two countries to shelve the territorial dispute, using Constructivist as well as Realist 
approaches. The second part contains a case study of the 2010 and the 2012/13 Senkaku incidents, the latter and 
most serious one started by Ishihara Shintaro, the right-wing Governor of Tokyo, when he declared in April 2012 his 
intention to have his local government buy some of the contested islands from its private owner which prompted the 
national government of Prime Minister Noda to buy them instead. The ensuing Chinese reaction has led to a crisis in 
the bilateral relationship which has political, military and economic implications of considerable importance for the 
future of Japan and China but also for the stability of the whole East Asian region. 
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Resumen: 
La disputa territorial entre Japón y China sobre la soberanía de las Islas Senkaku/Diaoyu está muy influida  por 
una serie de intereses económicos, circunstancias domésticas, cuestiones de identidad, exigencias de la legislación 
internacional y agravios históricos. Este artículo proporciona un análisis sobre estas cuestiones que también 
resultan a su vez indicativas del estado de las relaciones bilaterales en general. El análisis del período 1972-2010 
indaga en las razones de la erosión de los acuerdos de 1972 y 1978 que ambos países acordaron para poner de 
lado la disputa territorial, usando para ello perspectivas tanto constructivistas como realistas. La segunda parte 
contiene un estudio de caso de los incidentes de las Senkaku en el 2010 y 2012/13, el último de los cuales fue 
iniciado por Shintaro Ishihara, el marcadamente conservador gobernador de Tokio, cuando manifestó en abril del 
2012 la intención de su administración local de comprar algunas de las islas en disputa a sus propietarios privados, 
lo cual a su vez obligó al gobierno central del primer ministro Noda a adelantarse y comprarlas en su lugar. La 
respuesta ulterior por parte de China llevó a una crisis en las relaciones bilaterales de consecuencias políticas,  
militares y económicas de considerable importancia tanto para el futuro de las relaciones entre China y Japón 
como para la estabilidad de toda la región de Asia Oriental. 
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1. Introduction   
The Senkaku Islands (about 6 square kilometers), known to the Chinese as Diaoyu dao, 
consist of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks, located approximately 170 km 
southwest of Okinawa, the same distance from the northern tip of Taiwan, and 380 km from 
Wenzhou on the Chinese mainland.2 The disputes between Japan and China over the 
sovereignty of these islands and the closely linked issue of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) border demarcation in the East China Sea are framed by security concerns (territorial 
integrity; maritime defence space, Japan-US alliance), economic interests (oil, gas, fishing, 
seabed resources), international law requirements, domestic circumstances (political 
instability, the rise of non-governmental actors), national identity issues and historical 
grievances. The 2012 crisis which erupted over the Japanese central government`s purchase of 
some of the islands of the Senkaku Islands group in September 2012 from their private owner, 
has turned out even more severe than the previous one in 2010 when the Japanese authorities 
arrested the Chinese captain of a fishing vessel in one of the island`s territorial waters after 
two collisions with Japanese Coast Guard vessels. These recurring confrontations have 
grievous implications not only for Japanese-Chinese relations, but also for regional security 
and economic welfare. The similarly not-yet-demarcated EEZ border between China and the 
Republic of Korea has led to even worse clashes between the Korean Coast Guard and 
Chinese fishing vessels, claiming lives and causing injuries on both sides.3 The Japanese-
Chinese confrontations have arguably also led to a worsening of Japan`s other territorial 
disputes: with Korea over the Korea-held Dokto Islands (known to the Japanese as 
Takeshima), or the Russian-held Southern Kuriles islands (referred to by Japan as the 
`Northern Territories`). The territorial and border demarcation disputes in the East China Sea 
also have implications for similar conflicts between China and several countries around the 
South China Sea. The US policy towards these conflicts, and its support for its allies against 
the background of its pivot towards Asia, will heavily influence both the conduct of these 
regional players and US credibility as an alliance partner. Finally, in view of these 
confrontations and disputes, countries worldwide may reassess China`s stance towards the use 
of economic and military power and the country`s reliability as a business partner.  
The first part of this article discusses the historical background of the Senkaku dispute, 
i.e. the history-based arguments advanced by Japan and China to justify their respective 
claims, and how these arguments are being linked to international law. China approaches the 
historical background very differently from Japan, and argues today that Japan`s claim 
ultimately aims at reversing the outcome of the World War II. The analysis of the history of 
the Senkaku Islands is also linked by China to the wider historical dispute about Japan`s past 
aggression against China.  
In the second part, the author looks at the unofficial understanding in 1972, and 
reconfirmed in 1978, between Japan and China (negotiations for the normalization of 
diplomatic relations and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, respectively) to shelve the 
Senkaku territorial dispute. The author then analyses the domestic and international 
circumstances which led to the erosion and finally demise of this unofficial consensus which 
had helped to manage the dispute until about the middle of the 1990s. The author concludes 
that the leadership of both countries did not do enough to protect the 1972/1978 consensus, 
                                                          
2
 For the sake of simplicity, the name `Senkaku Islands` is normally used in this article. 
3
 Roehrig, Terence: “South Korea-China Maritime Disputes: toward a Solution”, East Asia Forum (27 
November 2012), at  
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/27/south-korea-china-maritime-disputes-toward-a-solution/. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 32 (Mayo / May 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
11 
and instead took measures which, in Japan`s case, amounted to strengthening the Japanese 
sovereignty claim, or in the case of China, to diminishing Japan`s sovereignty claim, which 
finally led to the major crises of 2010 and 2012.  
The analysis of the two crises shows the escalation of China`s political and economic 
retributions, which have undermined Japan`s official stance that there is no territorial dispute 
to be discussed and that Japan is in full control of the islands. China`s regularized law 
enforcement counter-measures (i.e. ship and airplane patrols by its coast guard and fishery 
agencies) since September 2012 have now led to the involvement of the military on both sides 
and heightened the risk of accidental clashes. Given the domestic and international dynamics, 
as well as the entrenched positions on both sides, the conflict over the sovereignty of the 
Senkaku Islands is not likely to go away very soon. The best one can hope for is management 
of the dispute and the prevention of armed clashes between the two sides so that the regional 
and global implications can be minimized. 
 
2. Historical Background 
2.1 History-Based versus Modern International Law-Based Claims 
Japan bases its sovereignty claim on the fact that it incorporated the islands as terra nullius 
(vacant territory) on the 14 January 1895 and has been continuously occupying the islands 
since then.4 China, however, argues that it discovered the islands long before and quotes 
several historical documents going back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) which mention the 
islands as part of Taiwan, although Taiwan was incorporated by the Qing Dynasty only in 
1683.5 After Japan`s incorporation of the islands in 1895, a private person (Koga Tatsushiro) 
used some of the islands for commercial purposes for several decades until World War II, also 
providing habitation for workers who were employed in his fish processing plant. The 
government of the PRC claimed the islands only in December 1971 after a report in 1969 by 
an UN-related organization mentioning the possibility of substantial oil and gas reserves 
around the area (Reedman/Shimazaki 2006, p. 43).6 This late claim was also very much in 
response to the Guomindang government in Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) which had 
already in February 1971, and again on the 11 June 1971, publicly opposed the return of the 
Senkaku Islands (called by the ROC `Diaoyutai`) as part of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan 
in 1972. Applying contemporary rules of international law, the Japanese side has a strong 
claim to the sovereignty over the islands because of the incorporation as vacant territory, and 
Japan`s effective control which went unchallenged for such a long time. 
China`s argument about `discovery` is not very strong in terms of modern international 
law because it never exercised effective control and Chinese never inhabited the islands. In a 
recent publication of the State Ocean Administration, however, it is argued that China not 
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only discovered the islands and used them, but also exercised long-term control over them.7 
`Discovery` according to the Chinese accounts simply means that the islands were mentioned 
in records written by people who passed them and used them as orientation points on their sea 
voyage between China and Okinawa/Japan, and considered them as part of China`s coastal 
defence.8 Moreover, the assertion that Japan acquired the islands as the result of the Sino-
Japanese War 1894-95, which was ended by the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 
1895, depends on whether one considers the Senkaku Islands part of Taiwan or part of 
Okinawa. The Shimonoseki Treaty included the cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores but did 
not mention the Senkaku Islands. The latitude and longitude of the Pescadores were given and 
a joint committee for demarcating territories was set up.9 In the map of Taiwan printed at the 
time the Senkaku Islands were not included. China, however, states that the Treaty included 
also the Senkaku Islands since they belong to Taiwan, which Japan refutes.10 
2.2. Political and Moral Caveats Regarding Japan`s 1895 Acquisition 
The historical circumstances of incorporation by Japan somewhat cast a shadow on Japan`s 
claim. Ivy Lee and Fan Ming – although they are in a minority – even express doubts about 
the legal basis of Japan`s claim in view of these circumstances.11 In the first instance, at the 
end of the 19th century, the region was in an amorphous transition from a Sino-centric East 
Asian world order to one dominated by Western international law. Imperial China insisted on 
sticking to the former, while Meiji Japan warmly embraced the latter. As Shaw explains 
territorial ownership meant different things under these two different concepts and Chinese 
scholars use it as a base to refute Japan`s claims to territorial accession.12  
From 1885 onwards, there was pressure from the local government in Okinawa and the 
entrepreneur Koga Tatsushiro, to incorporate the islands. But there is correspondence in 1885 
between the central government in Tokyo and local government in Ryukyu (called Okinawa 
today) where the former demanded caution in asserting any claim or putting markers on the 
islands. The reason given was concern over raising the ire and suspicion of the Qing 
government, which at that time was militarily still stronger than Japan. This is interpreted by 
some as Japan at least implicitly admitting the Qing government`s title to the islands.13 In 
contrast to the official Japanese version distributed since 1972 that, from 1885 on, there had 
been a series of surveys conducted by the Japanese government, documents clearly show that 
there were no such surveys.14 Moreover, in 1880, negotiations between the Meiji and Qing 
governments had taken place over the establishment of a southern border because the Qing 
government opposed Japan`s incremental takeover of the Ryukyu island chain which, in 1879, 
had been incorporated into Meiji Japan as a prefecture, after having been under dual Chinese 
and Japanese suzerainty since 1609. A draft treaty was finalized where the Japanese proposed 
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to draw the border between Ryukyu and China by giving China the Ryukyu islands of Miyako 
and Yaeyama and everything to the south of them, in exchange for commercial rights in 
China. There was no specific reference to the Senkaku Islands, but according to Hane this is 
not surprising since they belonged in the understanding of the Qing government to the 
Ryukyu island chain which as a whole was the object of negotiations.15 The treaty would have 
put the Senkaku islands on the Chinese side. For various reasons, China was reluctant to sign 
the agreement at the time, and from 1885 onwards, Japan no longer had any interest in signing 
either.16 Hane argues that these two circumstances – Tokyo`s hesitation to incorporate the 
Senkaku Islands, as well as making them the object of a deal – raise doubts about the 
Japanese  government`s claim today that the islands are `inherent territory` (koyu no ryodo) of 
Japan. Incidentally, there are some Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (including even 
President Jiang Jieshi in 1965), who also claim Ryukyu (Okinawa) because it was under 
Chinese suzerainty and allegedly only ceded to Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese war in 
1895 (which Japan had to repudiate in the 1951 San Francisco Treaty), but this claim is not 
pursued officially by either the Chinese or the Taiwanese governments.17 Such demands are 
today mentioned as a further reason by those urging Japan to take a strong position on the 
Senkaku Islands, because giving in on the Senkaku islands would only lead the Chinese to 
aim next at undermining Japan`s sovereignty over Okinawa.18 
Other historical circumstances used to contest Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Islands are 
the timing and secrecy of their incorporation on 14 January 1895. The incorporation occurred 
when China had lost decisive battles in the Sino-Japanese War, had put out peace feelers to 
Japan on 22 November 1895, and its ultimate defeat had become predictable.19 Therefore, 
from the documents quoted, for example by Hane and Shaw, it is clear that the Meiji 
government felt free in January 1895 to go ahead with incorporation of the islands, in contrast 
to its earlier hesitation. The Chinese surrender followed in March 1895, and the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki ended the war in April 1895. The incorporation by the Meiji government is 
therefore strictly speaking not related to the Shimonoseki Treaty although the timing and 
historical circumstances establish a causal link to the Sino-Japanese War. The Treaty does not 
contain any mention of the Senkaku Islands, only that China would cede to Japan `the island 
of Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa`, as 
Taiwan was then referred to. The PRC and ROC understands, however, that this wording 
applies also to the Senkaku Islands because they consider the Senkaku Islands as part of 
Taiwan.20  
The Japanese government never made public the act of incorporation.21 Although the 
act allowed the setting up of markers, according to Professor Inoue Kiyoshi, who did most of 
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the original research on the history of the islands, they were put up only in May 1969 by the 
local government of Ishigaki.22 When the Meiji government decreed the geographic extent of 
Okinawa prefecture in 1896, there was also no reference to the incorporation act or to the 
Senkaku islands.23 The withholding of publication of the 1895 act was confirmed to the 
author by a senior official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 October 2012, 
who, however, pointed out that the islands were not inhabited at the time of incorporation.  
Under international law, appropriation of territory is legally strengthened by making it 
public and by not being contested, but notification is not an absolute condition. However, 
even if the islands were incorporated without this being officially made public, it must have 
come to the attention of succeeding Chinese governments that the islands were being 
economically exploited and temporarily inhabited by Japanese citizens, since fishermen from 
Taiwan and China pursuing fishing activities in the area sometimes landed there to escape 
storms. Even at the beginning of the 1950s fishermen from Irabujima near Miyakojima had 
stayed on Minami Kojima for up to three months to process bonito and keep vegetable 
gardens, but were told in 1971 by the Japanese government not to go there anymore when 
China suddenly claimed the Senkaku Islands. Until then, Japanese researchers had also gone 
to the islands on several occasions and the islands were used as shelter during typhoons.24 
There is a letter of appreciation from the consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki in 
1920 which thanked the people of Ishigakijima for rescuing Chinese fishermen washed ashore 
on one of the Senkaku islands, stating that the islands are part of Okinawa prefecture. 25 An 
article in the People`s Daily in 1996 dismissed this letter as the perception of certain people 
given the circumstance of Japan having colonized Taiwan at the time.26 Even after the 
establishment of the People`s Republic of China there was an article in the People`s Daily on 
8 January 1953 reporting Okinawan demonstrations against the US and explicitly including 
the Senkaku Islands in the description of the Ryukyu Islands.27 Interestingly, the Chinese 
government does not mention this latter item in its counter claim. Instead, it simply asserts 
that the islands had been controlled by China for 600 years since the Ming Dynasty (referring 
to the above-mentioned accounts) and `in 1895, as the Qing government's defeat in the First 
Sino-Japanese War was all but certain, Japan illegally occupied the Diaoyu Island and its 
affiliated islands`.28 One more recent historical proof for China`s control of the islands is a 
document according to which the islands were given to a Chinese herb collector by the 
Empress Ci Xi in 1893. This document is now considered by both Chinese and Japanese 
historians alike as a forgery.29 The Chinese White Paper of 2012 no longer mentioned this 
document, but an article in the Beijing Review in 2012 still does.30 
 
                                                          
22
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2.3.The World War II Agreements and the Senkaku Islands  
Based on its assertion about the Sino-Japanese war and the Senkaku Islands being part of 
Taiwan, the PRC government argues that the allied agreements concerning the postwar period 
(Cairo Communique and Potsdam Declaration), and the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 
(neither the Guomindang government on Taiwan nor the PRC government were invited to the 
conference leading to the treaty) required Japan to return the Senkaku Islands. The Cairo 
Dec1aration in December 1943 demanded the return to the Republic of China of `all the 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the 
Pescadores.’31 Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration states that ` The terms of the Cairo 
Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of 
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine`.32 Article 2 (b) 
of the San Francisco Treaty stipulates that ` Japan renounces all right, title and claim to 
Formosa and the Pescadores`.33 The Senkaku Islands are nowhere mentioned in these 
documents, but because of its assertion about the islands being part of Taiwan the Chinese 
consider them to be included.34 However, the PRC has never recognized the legality of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Treaty itself does not even clarify to what China Taiwan 
should be returned,35 In an unsigned draft planning document of May 1950 from the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the PRC`s possible participation in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, and published in the Japanese media only in December 2012 as proof of China 
recognizing Japan`s ownership, the islands are referred to by their Japanese name, and it is 
proposed to examine whether these islands are part of Taiwan, thus throwing doubt on 
China`s claim today that they have always been part of Taiwan and not Okinawa, and had 
been ceded to Japan in 1895 as part of Taiwan.36 Professor Liu Jiangyong of Qinghua 
University explained the use of the Japanese name by the circumstance that this name was, 
after the Japanese colonization of Taiwan, the more popular name.37 
Another battle field between Japan and China for proving their sovereignty is the use of 
maps. Both sides have been trying to prove their title to the islands by referring to maps where 
the islands are either shown as belonging to China (or Taiwan) or Japan, or using Chinese 
names instead of Japanese names.38 However, until 1970 when the islands became an object 
of dispute, the inconsistencies on both sides seem to have more to do with ignorance, 
disinterest and confusion concerning these very minor and far-flung islands rather than being 
the object of centrally-directed and authorized map making, as was also demonstrated in the 
above-mentioned May 1950 draft document of the PRC. During World War II and in its 
aftermath, there was considerable confusion within the Guomindang government about 
whether it should or could claim the Ryukyu Islands (but no explicit mentioning of the 
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Senkaku Islands) or not.39 Ishii mentions that the ROC government at one stage demanded to 
take part in the Trusteeship of Okinawa.40 According to an article in the newspaper of the 
Chinese Communist Party, Roosevelt even offered Jiang Jieshi Okinawa (which then would 
have naturally included the Senkaku Islands) during the Cairo conference in 1943, but Jiang 
turned it down.41 
 
3. The Genesis of the Controversy 
3.1. Turning Point: The Reversion of Okinawa in 1971 
As a result of World War II, Okinawa, including the Senkaku Islands as part of the Nansei 
Shoto Islands (south of 29°north latitude), was placed under US administration and became a 
central anchor of the US military deployment in Asia. During the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
negotiations, the US and the UK agreed that Japan would retain `residual sovereignty` over 
Okinawa, and that the US would not require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over 
Okinawa.42 It is obvious that the Japanese felt encouraged to consider the Senkaku Islands as 
being included in the `residual sovereignty over Okinawa` since, for Tokyo, the islands were 
part of Okinawa. Moreover, when the government of the Republic of China normalized 
diplomatic relations with Japan in 1952 (Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of 
China), the subject of the islands had not been raised by either side. In a separate exchange of 
notes, both sides had agreed that the Treaty `be applicable to all the territories which are now, 
or which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government` which refers to the ROC 
government.43 
But when the US announced in 1953 its intention to return to Japan the Amami Islands 
(north of Okinawa main island) as part of the Nansei Shoto, the ROC government (but not the 
PRC) protested against the US legal justification of doing so under the concept of Japan`s 
`residual sovereignty` over these islands because this concept was not part of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty.44 When the US started to discuss with Japan the transfer of the 
administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, leading to the conclusion of the `Agreement 
Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the 
Daito Islands` (signed on 17 June 1971), Taibei urged the US in September 1970 not to 
include the Senkaku Islands, and to keep the sovereignty issue open.45 The ROC ambassador 
to the US, in a note of 15 March 1971, explained his government`s silence concerning the 
Senkaku Islands until then by saying `for regional security considerations the Government of 
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the Republic of China has hitherto not challenged the US military occupation of the Senkaku 
Islands under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to 
international law, temporary military occupation of an area does not affect the ultimate 
determination of its sovereignty`.46 He then asked for the restoration of the islands to the 
ROC. `Regional security considerations` certainly meant that under the Cold War conditions 
and its confrontation with Beijing, the ROC government did not want to do anything which 
might have diminished the military power of or its good relationship with its American 
protector. Moreover Japan was an important anti-communist neighbour for Taiwan, and 
therefore the ROC government had, in 1951, waived all reparations from Japan. Under 
pressure from both allies (the US still had diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1971!), the US 
had to choose whether to go against Japan or Taiwan, and in the end decided to be more 
supportive of Japan`s demand. As a compromise, the US Administration stated during Senate 
hearings on the reversion that` The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands 
and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the 
parties concerned`, the latter including the ROC and the PRC.47 Since the reversion in 1971, 
the US has stuck to not taking a position on the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands and 
emphasizing that the 1971 Agreement transferred only the `administrative rights` to Japan. 
But not only did the US in this way allow Japan to regain control over the Senkaku Islands 
and enable it to reinforce its sovereignty claim thanks to the reversion, it also agreed the 
application of the 1960 revised Japan-US Security Treaty over the Okinawa area, including 
explicitly the Senkaku Islands. When reading the proposal by the National Security Staff 
member John Holdridge to return `the Ryukyus (sic) and the Senkakus` but to pass no 
judgement as to the conflicting claims to them, the President`s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, Henry Kissinger, wrote on the margin of the memo of 13 April 1971: `But that is 
nonsense since it gives islands back to Japan. How can we get a more neutral position?`48 
While the above sheds some light on why the ROC did not make any public claims to 
the title of the Senkakus between 1945 and 1970, it does not explain its silence before that 
period, or even for the period 1945-1949, i.e. before the establishment of the PRC. Shaw 
offers the theory that this was because the Guomindang government did not have any history 
of ruling Taiwan and had to rely on Japanese colonial records and maps when it took over 
Taiwan in 1945.49 The US Department of State documents (FRUS) reveal that, for the ROC 
government, it was very much the opposition by public opinion in Taiwan to the islands` 
return to Japan, as well as by overseas Chinese which put pressure on Taibei in 1970 to 
oppose the transfer of the islands to Japan.50 Another reason not mentioned in these 
documents is the report of hydrocarbon reserves around the islands. The Committee for 
Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP), 
under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), had 
conducted a geophysical survey in 1968. The Committee said in a report in May 1969 that the 
continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be extremely rich in oil reserves.51 Soon 
                                                          
46
 Ibid. p. 296. 
47
 Niksch, Larry: “Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and Obligations”, 
Congressional Research Committee (1996), p. 4, at 
http://congressionalresearch.com/96-
798/document.php?study=Senkaku+Diaoyu+Islands+Dispute+The+U.S.+Legal+Relationship+and+Obligations. 
48
 FRUS 2006, op. cit., p. 297. 
49
 Shaw, op. cit., p. 119. 
50
 FRUS, op. cit., p. 292. On the Overseas Chinese see also Shaw, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
51
 Gao, Zhiguo and Wu Jilu: “Key Issues in the East China Sea: A Status Report and recommended 
Approaches”, in: Harrison, Selig (ed.) (2005): Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation?, 
Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, p. 32. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 32 (Mayo / May 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
18 
after the publication of this report, Japan started to explore with Taiwan and the Republic of 
Korea possibilities for joint development of the Sea`s hydrocarbon resources. In March 1969, 
Japan began protracted negotiations with Taiwan and South Korea, leading to an agreement in 
principle in September 1970, to set up a joint development project.52  
If the ROC had until 1945 no experience of ruling Taiwan, then the PRC government 
had even less experience with the area of the Senkaku Islands. Their negligible size and 
remote location before the likelihood of hydrocarbon reserves was raised certainly did not 
draw any attention to them. The above circumstances explain also the timing of the PRC`s 
claim. In addition, and probably more urgent at a time when the government was just 
emerging from the political ravages of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC could not stay quiet 
in the face of Taiwan`s and the overseas Chinese claims if it wanted to be recognized as the 
sole representative of China. The first newspaper reports about China`s claims came out in 
May 1970, after Japan and Taiwan had started talks on jointly exploring the energy resources 
around the Senkaku Islands, and Okinawa`s reversion was announced. Only on 30 December 
1971 did the Chinese Foreign Ministry publish an official statement claiming the islands.53 
The weakest point of the territorial claim to the Senkaku Islands by the Republic of 
China and, since 1949, that by the People`s Republic of China is, therefore, that, until the 
ECAFE survey of the East China Sea, the islands were not claimed by either the PRC or the 
ROC governments, and Japan`s control over the islands had been uncontested. Shaw calls this 
absence of objection a `serious political misstep`.54 The contrast to the Chinese claims to 
almost the whole of the South China Sea is revealing: the 9 dash line (originally 11 dash line) 
on which China`s claims to the South China Sea is based was already established in 1947 but 
had appeared in Chinese maps in one form or the other since 1936, and was then taken over in 
1949 by the PRC.55 
In meetings with PRC academics in February 2013 this author was given several 
reasons for the long silence of the Beijing government which include some of those 
mentioned above. First of all the government never saw a reason to specifically claim the 
islands because according to the PRC interpretation of the Shimonoseki Treaty they had been 
taken away from China as part of Taiwan and Japan had to return them as a result of the 
above mentioned wartime and postwar agreements. All counterarguments about the islands 
not having been mentioned in these agreements (in contrast to e.g. the Penghu Islands) were 
swept away by the assertion that the Diaoyu Islands are part of Taiwan. The US 
administration over Okinawa which explicitly includes the Senkaku Islands and the US/UK 
statement concerning Japan`s residual sovereignty over Okinawa during the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty negotiations (at that time no difference between Japanese sovereignty over 
Okinawa and administrative rights over the Senkaku Islands had yet been made) were simply 
considered as counteracted by two PRC statements in 1951 which declared the treaty illegal. 
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Interestingly in our context, in these statements Beijing claimed the Paracel Islands, the 
Spratly Islands and the Pratas Islands as part of China.56 Even if the PRC considered the 
Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan, it is strange that no claim to the Senkaku Islands was 
made although Taiwan was under the control of the Guomindang whereas the Senkaku 
Islands in contrast were put under US administration (and moreover joined to Okinawa) while 
the Pratas Islands were put under UN Trusteeship. Another explanation given by these PRC 
academics for China`s silence is the absence of diplomatic relations between Beijing and 
Tokyo until 1972. It is not clear to this author why this should have prevented Beijing from 
protesting against Japan`s territorial claim to the islands since the government on many 
occasions before 1972 protested Japanese policies and even concluded `private` fishery 
agreements which managed to circumvent the territorial dispute. Another reason mentioned 
was China`s domestic instability during the Cultural Revolution 1966-69 which certainly 
distracted the PRC leadership from dealing with such minor islands. 
3.2. Was The Senkaku Issue Shelved in 1972 and 1978? 
What had been keeping the territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing under control from 
the 1970s until the 1990s was an unofficial understanding (`anmoku no ryokai` in Japanese) 
in 1972 and 1978 to shelve the dispute (`tana age` in Japanese, `gezhi` in Chinese). However, 
the Japanese government later explicitly denied such an understanding. Since this shelving 
agreement helped to keep the territorial conflict under wraps for such a long time despite 
several incidents and played a critical role in the 2010 and 2012 crises, it is important to 
investigate the circumstances of what was understood in 1972 and 1978, and why this 
understanding fell apart.  
In 1972, the two countries normalized diplomatic relations, and in 1978, they concluded 
a Peace and Friendship Treaty. On the occasion of both negotiations, it was the Japanese side 
which raised the issue of the Senkaku Islands, and agreed to proceed to a conclusion of the 
respective negotiation despite diametrically opposed claims to the ownership of the Senkaku 
Islands. In other words, both governments agreed to shelve the issue, albeit not in writing or 
in any public or legal form. In the case of the September 1972 negotiations between Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, the territorial issue (as well as the 
exact wording of Japan`s apologies about its past actions in China, which Tanaka offered to 
Zhou Enlai) was so sensitive for the Japanese government that the record of the Gaimusho 
omits the reaction of Tanaka to Zhou Enlai`s refusal to discuss the territorial issue. This part 
was deleted by the then head of the China Division in the Gaimusho, Hashimoto Hiroshi, who 
later admitted this in an interview in 2000. In the interview he said that Tanaka Kakuei, in 
reaction to Zhou Enlai`s reasoning that it would be better not to discuss the problem of the 
Senkaku Islands, replied, `Let`s discuss it another time`.57 Yabuki corrobates this reaction by 
quoting the book by Zhang Xiangshan, an adviser to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
who was present at one of the meetings. According to his record, Tanaka replied, `All right! 
Then it is not necessary to talk anymore about it. Let`s do it another time.`58 Before this 
summit meeting, Komeito Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu who served as an important go-
between for the Japanese government to prepare the visit by Prime Minister Tanaka, had a 
similar exchange with Zhou Enlai in July 1972, when it was also decided to shelve the 
Senkaku issue. When Takeiri met Zhou Enlai on 28 July 1972, the latter is quoted as saying, 
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`There is no need to touch on the Senkaku Islands issue. Mr Takeiri, you also had no interest. 
I also had no interest. But the historians raise it as a problem due to the oil issue, and Mr 
Inoue Kiyoshi is very keen on it. However, there is no need to place importance on it (omoku 
miru)`.59 It is an irony that Zhou Enlai even referred to a Japanese academic, Professor Inoue 
Kiyoshi, whose historical studies favour China`s claim on historical grounds, and whose 
opinion had been presented in an article of the People`s Daily in May 1971 and had obviously 
been read by Zhou. In these discussions, it was made quite clear by both sides that the 
normalization of diplomatic relations was the most important goal, and therefore they agreed 
to shelve the Senkaku issue.  
When both sides negotiated the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, there was a 
similar willingness to put the territorial problem aside in order to achieve the conclusion of 
the Treaty although the Gaimusho (Japan`s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has so far not 
released the documents. According to Fravel, a chronology (nianpu in Chinese) of Deng’s 
activities published by a party research office summarizes a meeting between Deng Xiaoping 
and Japan`s Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao, according to which Deng stated, `It's not that 
China and Japan do not have any problems. For example [there are] the Diaoyu Island and 
continental shelf issues. Don't drag them in now, they can be set aside to be calmly discussed 
later and we can slowly reach a way that both sides can accept. If our generation cannot find a 
way, the next generation or the one after that will find a way.’60 After the ratification of the 
Treaty, Deng Xiaoping visited Japan and declared at a press conference on 25 October 1978 
that the issue should be left to future generations who may be wiser. In Diet discussions, it 
was also made clear by LDP Secretary General Ohira Masayoshi and Foreign Minister 
Sonoda Sunao that it was in Japan`s national interest to go along with Deng Xiaoping`s 
proposal to leave things for the next 20 or 30 years.61 Ohira declared at the time on the 
question of an agreement to shelve the issue (tana age) that `tana age` was not correct, rather 
the other party (senpo) would not bring the issue up (mochidasanai).62 Or, as Sonoda wrote 
later, while it is true that China is claiming these islands as their territory, the islands are 
currently in Japan's hands, and have not become an actual issue among Japan and China. If 
Japan takes the trouble to bring up the subject at this occasion and wakes up a sleeping dog 
(literally `disturb a bush only to let a snake out’ – yabu hebi), it will be a total loss (moto mo 
ko mo nai) for Japan.63 
One cannot but conclude from these accounts that both sides agreed to shelve the 
territorial issue while in no way abandoning their claims to the islands, otherwise there would 
not have been a normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972 or a Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship in 1978. It did not mean that the Chinese accepted Japan`s territorial claim since 
China had stated its own claim in these negotiations and has since 1971 never abandoned the 
claim. It is also obvious that both sides knew that there was a territorial problem, otherwise 
`shelving` would not have made sense. The director of the Treatise Division and later Director 
General of the Treatise Bureau, Kuriyama Takakazu, who was involved in the negotiations in 
1972 and in 1978, stated in an interview in 2012 that he understood it both then and today that 
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there was a `tacit understanding` (anmoku no ryokai) between Japan and China to shelve the 
territorial issue.64 Asai Motofumi, who was director of the Treatise Division in 1978-80 and 
director of the China Division in 1983-85, also confirmed that it was the understanding not 
only in the Gaimusho but also among the political leadership (Nagatacho) that there was a 
territorial problem concerning the Senkaku Islands.65 Miyamoto Yuji also mentioned in 2012 
that in his time as head of the China Division in the 1990s, there was still on the one hand, a 
clear position that the Senkaku Islands were Japanese territory, but on the other, the 
fundamental stance of maintaining the status quo (genjo iji) and a tacit understanding that no 
action needed to be taken.66Another indirect indication of Japan tacitly accepting the existence 
of a territorial problem and willing to suspend the issue to protect the overall relationship with 
China has been the government`s restraint for some time after 1972 and 1978 in taking actions 
which might have been interpreted by China as inflaming the territorial dispute. The 
government never allowed prospection and production of oil or gas reserves around the 
islands, and showed restraint in allowing landing on or making economic use of the islands. 
As we will see in the next part, however, this restraint was not absolute and still left room for 
measures which eroded the shelving agreement. 
It is obvious from the historical context of the 1972 and 1978 negotiations that both 
sides had much greater interests at stake than the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, the shelving 
agreement was very much in favour of Japan as the country in de facto control over the 
islands, and thus reinforcing Tokyo`s ownership claim in international law. Later, when 
China`s political, economic and military weight increased and it became doubtful whether the 
US would really invoke the Security Treaty guarantee to protect the militarily-indefensible 
islands against a Chinese military challenge, the shelving agreement was useful for Japan 
against any such contingency.67 
3.3. The Erosion of the Shelving Agreement 
While one can well understand the desire by the Japanese and Chinese leaders to deepen the 
bilateral relationship through the two agreements in 1972 and 1978, and to trust that all 
remaining problems, including the territorial dispute, would then be easier to solve, with 
hindsight, this faith looks more like wishful thinking. It is indeed rather unusual to even 
conclude a Peace and Friendship Treaty without clarifying an open territorial issue, the very 
heart of a country`s security policy. Since the 1970s, this dispute has not only been a sensitive 
issue within Japan, but also within the much more limited circle of the autocratic Chinese 
leadership, with political groupings in both countries instrumentalizing it for their own narrow 
purposes.  
The main conceptual problem with the bilateral understanding has been that it was 
based on the assumption that the conditions allowing its formulation in the 1970s could be 
frozen for as long as it would take to find a solution to the opposing territorial claims. 
However, maintaining the conditions for the continued reliance on the bilateral understanding 
would have demanded much greater efforts by both sides to clarify what the status quo is, and 
what measures would be seen as violating the status quo. Instead, as Ishii Akira put it, the 
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leaders on both sides wasted time and allowed the territorial issue to become the symbol of 
the nationalism in both countries.68 As a result, various changes and pressures in the domestic 
and international environment were allowed to gradually erode these conditions, with Japan`s 
government in the end publicly even denying that there was a dispute which could have been 
the object of shelving, and prompting the PRC in the 2010 and 2012 crises to shower Japan 
with political and economic sanctions, which were unprecedented for two countries 
supposedly bound by a Peace and Friendship Treaty.  
The shelving agreement had obviously no legal force, but denying its existence was 
politically unwise and morally wrong. Okabe Tatsumi argues that for political convenience, 
Japan agreed in 1978 to shelve the issue, but that this was different from accepting it in a legal 
sense.69. The following official Japanese statements can be interpreted in this light: in October 
1990, Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto Misoji, after having restated Japan`s sovereignty claim, 
still declared that the island issue between Japan, China and Taiwan (sic) should be solved by 
a later generation, thus implying that there was a territorial dispute which had been put aside70 
But by the time China promulgated its law on territorial waters in February 1992 (see below), 
the Japanese government would unequivocally and publicly deny that there had been any 
agreement to shelve the issue and even that there was a territorial issue. When Prime Minister 
Miyazawa Kiichi protested against the Chinese law in February 1992, referring to a prior 
understanding with Deng Xiaoping over the Senkaku Islands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) issued a correction denying such an understanding.71 In September 1996, 
Administrative Vice-Minister Hayashi Sadayuki said that Japan had not agreed with Deng’s 
‘put on the shelf’ proposal, i.e. arguing that there was no territorial issue.72 In the following, 
the author analyses the three main circumstances which account for the breakdown of the 
bilateral understanding.  
3.3.1. The Corrosive Role of International Law 
The requirements of international law regimes, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratified by Japan and the PRC in 1996, prompted both 
countries to take domestic and/or international administrative and legal steps (for example, 
passing legislation related to the administration of their maritime space, demarcating their sea 
borders, and claiming borders for their EEZ) which had a general purpose but did not 
sufficiently take into account the need to protect the bilateral understanding of putting the 
territorial dispute aside. Moreover, international regimes have `vested otherwise worthless 
islands with immense economic value`.73 They encourage the assertion of sovereignty and 
penalize states for appearing to acquiesce in a rival state`s claim to a disputed territory. Paul 
O`Shea applied the term `sovereignty game` to this diplomatic-legal tit-for-tat, based on 
Alexander Wendt`s conception of sovereignty as a socially constructed institution.74 Finally 
the vagueness of international law allows states to cherry pick those norms which fit best their 
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interests and claims.75 It is probably with this situation in mind that former Chinese 
ambassador to Japan and the UN, Chen Jian, explained at the beginning of a talk on 30 
October 2012 that international law is a root cause of the current territorial disputes.76 This 
author has too much respect for international law, notably UNCLOS, to agree with this strong 
statement, but is aware of the weaknesses of many legal stipulations. 
With regard to the Senkaku dispute, international law regimes have thus brought with it 
the following complications: 
- Both countries must always consider that whatever is decided in relation to the disputed 
Senkaku Islands might have implications for the country`s other territorial disputes (Japan`s 
territorial disputes with Korea and Russia; China`s EEZ dispute with Korea or territorial 
disputes with the other littoral claimants in the South China Sea ) 
- Any action taken by the Japanese government with regard to the Senkaku Islands can be 
interpreted as the official expression of the government in control of the islands, and China 
will therefore feel obliged to protest in order to defend its claim 
- Both countries had to comply with UNCLOS in order to benefit from this regime and 
officially draw sea borders which start with base lines on which are dependent the extent of 
the Territorial Waters (12 nm from the base line), of the Contiguous Zone (24 nm from the 
base line), of the EEZ (200 nm from the baseline), and of the Extended Continental Shelf 
(under certain conditions, up to 350 nm from the base line can be claimed). The issues arising 
from this are whether Japan and China would apply the drawing of the sea borders to the 
disputed territory, and, if so, whether the Senkaku Islands could be classified as `islands` 
which are entitled to an EEZ, or just `rocks` which would entitle them only to territorial 
waters under UNCLOS Article 12.3, and how to draw the EEZ border in the East China Sea`s 
Senkaku area. These issues were bound to have an impact on the bilateral understanding in 
one way or the other, and would have required special action in order to keep the territorial 
dispute shelved.  
 
When China passed its Territorial Law in 1992, it explicitly included the Diaoyu Islands 
which, naturally, was immediately protested by the Japanese government while still showing 
a considerable amount of understanding and specifically saying that the law did not violate 
Japan`s sovereignty over the islands.77 At that time, the Japanese government was still 
preoccupied with preventing China`s isolation after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. China 
also played down the impact of this law and even referred to Deng Xiaoping`s 1978 statement 
of leaving the territorial issue for the future.78 When Jiang Zemin visited Japan in April 1992, 
he also reaffirmed the shelving according to Deng`s promise in 1978, while still stating 
China`s claim to the islands.79 However, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter 
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Waijiaobu or CMOFA) originally had not wanted to include the Senkaku Islands.80 Including 
them did undermine the strength of the shelving agreement, and one can arguably date the 
start of the process leading to the ultimate breakdown of the shelving agreement to around this 
time. When it ratified UNCLOS in 1996, China referred to the 1992 Law and promulgated the 
precise location of its base lines, but left out some of them, including those for the Senkaku 
Islands.81 In 1998, the National People`s Congress promulgated the PRC Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf Act, which did not mention any specific geographical areas. 
Clearly, the Chinese leadership was trying to walk a fine line between its territorial and EEZ 
claims (including the need to respond to domestic demands, increasingly dominated by 
nationalist tendencies), the requirements of the international law regime, and the maintenance 
of good relations with Japan.  
Japan ratified UNCLOS in June 1996, and established in the following month the Law 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, as well as the Law on the EEZ and 
Continental Shelf, which were supplemented by guidelines for implementation. The latter also 
established an EEZ around the Senkaku Islands. Japan did not include the Senkaku Islands 
into its straight baseline claim.82 Two separate bills creating the Basic Law of the Ocean and 
the Law on Establishing Safety Areas for Maritime Structures were passed by the Diet in 
April 2007, and came into effect on 16 July 2007.83 The latter two laws were passed mainly 
having in mind any future exploitation of natural resources in the contested EEZs. Naturally 
China does not recognize the validity of these laws for the Senkaku Islands, or for the EEZ 
border between the two countries. The territorial dispute is also a major obstacle for 
agreement on the EEZ border in the southern area of the East China Sea, which is not made 
easier by the fact that an agreement on the title to the Senkaku would have a major impact on 
the size of the EEZ area of the successful claimant. 
3.3.2. Fishing and other Economic Interests 
Fishing is a major interest for all littoral states of the East China Sea. Although Japan and 
China have concluded consecutive fishery agreements for the East China Sea, the 1997 
agreement (effective from June 2000) excludes from the application of the fisheries 
agreement the territorial waters adjacent to the Senkaku Islands. Instead, the extant 1975 
Fishery Agreement, which deemed the areas around the Senkakus as part of the high seas, was 
allowed to prevail.84 In 2012, a letter related to the 1997 Agreement about fishing in the EEZ 
was revealed in which Foreign Minister Obuchi had stated to the Chinese ambassador in 
Tokyo, Xu Duxin, that Japan’s laws and regulations would not apply to the `waters in 
question` (togai no suiiki). It is understood that the `waters in question` include the Senkaku 
Islands, although their name is not mentioned and the Japanese government today denies it.85 
Sato Masaru, a former analyst of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, explained that this letter 
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referred to the EEZ around the Senkaku Islands and applied only to Chinese fishermen.86 
However, the Japanese government seems not to want to allow foreign fishermen 
uncontrolled access to the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, and has been 
patrolling the area, which has resulted in the expulsion of Chinese fishermen and subsequent 
protests by Taiwan and the PRC. The Japanese controls have apparently increased in the 
decade since 2000, while Chinese fishing activities have also vastly increased.87 More 
research is needed on these developments to judge whether here there is yet another 
`unofficial understanding` between Tokyo and Beijing which has been undermined. 
Finally, in this context, one has to mention the issue of private and state ownership of 
the Senkaku Islands which falls under the headings of international law, as well as the role of 
non-state actors. In 1896, Koga Tatsushiro obtained a free lease of 30 years for the islands of 
Uotsurijima, Kubajima, Minami Kojima and Kita Kojima. After the death of Koga Tatsushiro 
in 1918, his son, Koga Zenji, took over the business on the islands. In 1926, after the end of 
the free lease, the Japanese government converted it to a rental basis.88 In 1932, the Japanese 
government changed the status of these four islands from state-owned to privately-owned land 
by selling them to the Koga family. After 1945, Kubajima and Taishojima (the latter was 
always state-owned) were leased to the US as firing ranges. In 1972, Koga Zenji sold Kita 
Kojima and Minami Kojima, followed by Uotsurshima in 1978, and Kubajima in 1988, to 
Kurihara Kunioki, a real estate investor, and his family. In 2002, Kitakojima, Minami Kojima 
and Uotsurijima were leased to the state which paid Yen25 million per year for them in rent.89 
The US military used Kubajima and Taishojima from 1957 as firing ranges, and after the 
reversion of Okinawa in 1971, continued to do so until 1979. It paid rent to the private owner 
of Kubajima, but after 1971, the rental payment was effected by the Japanese government.90 
The relevant point here is that, since the shelving of the territorial issue in 1972 and 
1978, the islands changed private owners, and the state rented three of the islands from their 
private owner and owned one. The leasing in 2002 and the `nationalization` (no money was 
involved) of the Uotsurijima beacon in 2005 caused Chinese protests, but the private 
ownership changes did not cause any Chinese reaction.91 This is an important point, because it 
was the sale of three islands to the Japanese central state which touched off the 2012 crisis. 
3.3.3. The Impact of Oil and Gas Developments 
The 1969 ECAFE Report had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC over the Senkaku 
Islands. The most promising area defined in this report for hydrocarbon resources happened to 
be around the Senkaku Islands. Since Japan abandoned its joint exploration plans with Taiwan 
in 1972 with the diplomatic recognition of the PRC, no Japanese activities have taken place 
because of concern about China`s reaction. 
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In order to quell its growing demand for oil and gas, and to diversify away from its high 
dependence on Middle Eastern supplies, China started in the 1970s with prospecting and 
extraction of energy resources in the East China Sea.92 To overcome the territorial dispute in 
the south of the East China Sea, and the divergent position on how to draw the EEZ border in 
the rest of the East China Sea, China proposed `joint development` of hydrocarbon resources. 
In October 1980, PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even proposed to a Japanese business 
delegation that development of off-shore oil resources around the disputed islands be done 
jointly by China, Japan and the US.93 Another bilateral proposal was made in 1984 by Deng 
Xiaoping, who proposed solving the territorial problems of the Spratly Islands in the South 
China Sea and the Senkaku Islands, by jointly developing the disputed areas before discussing 
the question of sovereignty. But in this case, as well as later proposals until 1996, Japan first 
demanded a settlement of the maritime border or recognition of its title to the Senkaku 
Islands.94 
China`s relentless progress and expansion of oil and gas development increasingly 
caused friction between Japan and China, which also impacted on the territorial dispute. Since 
1996, Chinese research vessels have entered the waters of the Senkaku Islands, including its 
territorial waters.95 Japan exerted great restraint and until 2004, did not allow Japanese 
companies to survey the ECS even in the area which it claimed as its EEZ, let alone around 
the Senkaku Islands. Moreover Tokyo`s permission for surveying in 2004 by a Japanese 
exploration company (never followed up because of the political risks involved) in response 
to Chinese oil and gas development near Japan`s claimed EEZ border was only for an area 
further north, away from the disputed islands. 
The Senkaku Islands dispute contributed to the failure of following up on the joint 
understanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japanese; liangjie in Chinese) to engage in joint 
development of an area in the north of the East China Sea and to allow Japan to join the 
Chunxiao gas field exploitation which had been developed by China in a disputed EEZ area.96 
During the negotiation of the 2008 joint understanding, the Chinese had demanded joint 
development of energy resources in the area around the Senkaku Islands in exchange for their 
compromise on joint development in other areas of the East China Sea. Although the Chinese 
government agreed to the understanding without getting satisfaction on its demand, the failure 
to achieve greater reciprocity from the Japanese in the Senkaku area then made it 
domestically impossible for the Chinese government to go any further with negotiating an 
implementation of the understanding.97 In December 2008, two Chinese patrol vessels of the 
China Marine Surveillance (CMS, Haijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean 
Administration (SOA), entered for the first time the territorial waters around the Senkaku 
Islands in an apparent move to strengthen its claim to the islands.98 
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3.3.4. Instrumentalization of the Senkaku Dispute by Politicians and Non-State Actors 
The raising of the territorial issue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign of the Bao 
Diao (Protect the Diaoyu) movement, notably in Taiwan and Hong Kong, since the ECAFE 
report, led to a similar involvement of the Japanese political right and other nationalistic 
groups which took up the issue as a symbol of nationalism. In 1973, several rightwing 
politicians within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, including Ishihara Shintaro who in 
2012 became the trigger for the central government`s purchase of some of the Senkaku 
islands, established the so-called Seirankai. It was particularly Ishihara who raised the 
territorial issue and opposed its shelving by Prime Minister Tanaka.99 Against the increase of 
tensions between Japan and China since the middle of the 1990s, the supra-partisan Diet 
Association for the Preservation of Territorial Integrity was established in 2004 which had 60 
members by 2011. On 30 March 2004, the Security Committee of the Lower House passed a 
resolution on preserving territorial integrity and demanded a stronger Japanese stance. It was 
the first time the Diet passed a resolution relevant to the Senkaku Islands in this vein.100 
Edano Yukio, chief of the Constitution Research Committee of the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), then in opposition, proposed that Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops should be 
stationed on the disputed Senkaku Islands to avoid incursions by other countries.101 Since 
SDF members are civil servants (komuin), this demand sounds very familiar to the demands 
by Abe Shinzo in December 2012 to station komuin on the islands (without clarifying whether 
he meant soldiers or other civil servants), although he postponed a decision when taking over 
the government in December 2012. This shows the opportunistic exploitation of the territorial 
dispute for electoral purposes. 
Nationalist politicians and activists have also been demanding to erect facilities on the 
islands such as a weather station, a beacon, a heliport or a harbor, in order to assert Japan`s 
sovereignty. The Nihon Seinensha (Japanese Youth Federation), a nationalist organization 
affiliated with the major yakuza group Sumiyoshi-kai, caused several incidents by landing on 
the islands, starting with erecting a light tower or beacon first on Uotsurijima in September 
1978 which was enlarged in 1988, and another one on Kitakojima Island in 1996.102 Each 
such landing caused protests in China and among the Chinese diaspora, and prompted the 
PRC government to complain officially. It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light 
towers be officially recognized by the government and the maintenance be taken on by the 
Maritime Safety Agency (later called Coast Guard). But even the compromise of including 
the light tower into official charts was an official act, reinforcing Japan`s effective control 
over the islands. The discussion about the official handling of the light tower also raised the 
nationalist fever in Taiwan, and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at the last 
moment) a commando action at the end of 1990 to destroy the facility.103 In February 2005, 
amidst rising tensions over China`s energy developments in contested parts of the East China 
Sea and Chinese protests against Prime Minister Koizumi`s Yasukuni Shrine visits, the 
Japanese government finally ceded to the demands of the group to take over the Uotsurijima 
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lighthouse structure and its maintenance.104 Until then, the Gaimusho had succeeded in 
delaying this state takeover as `too premature` in order not to provoke China.105  
As can be seen, the Japanese government tried to resist these nationalist claims but it 
could not fully circumvent them, thus keeping China`s suspicion alive. Moreover, whereas it 
always tries to prevent the landing by any foreigners on the islands, it has not prevented until 
fairly recently the landing by Japanese. In order to keep foreigners out of the islands and their 
territorial waters, the Japanese Coast Guard (CG) has been patrolling the area which again is 
an official act. It may have been the nationalist pressure from within the LDP as well as from 
right wing circles which prompted Ohira Masayoshi when he was Prime Minister to send in 
1979 a general survey team of 50 persons (including Kurihara Hiroyuki) to the islands in 
order to investigate the building of facilities like a helioport. Such demands had already been 
made by the LDP on 24 March 1978.106 Although the final report of the survey spoke against 
building facilities and nothing followed from it, the Kurihara family considered Ohira to be 
the most supportive prime minister of all for the Japanese assertion of effective control over 
the islands. Before that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiroyuki`s proposal to set up on 
Uotsurijima a monument to honour Koga Tatsushiro which was done with the government`s 
material and financial support.107 
Even on the relatively much more cohesive side of the Chinese leadership, the territorial 
issue has been divisive and has been instrumentalised. Just when the two sides were 
negotiating the Peace and Friendship Treaty in April 1978, about 100 Chinese fishing vessels, 
some armed, appeared around the Senkaku area with banners declaring China`s title to the 
islands. While this was explained at the time in Japan as possibly a means to put pressure on 
the Japanese during the treaty negotiations, it seems now more likely that the Senkaku issue 
was used by the followers of the Chairman of the Military Commission, Hua Guofeng, as a 
means of attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiaoping. The PRC central leadership explained at 
the time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiaoping promised it would never happen 
again.108 
3.3.5. The General Deterioration of Japanese-Chinese Relations since the 1990s 
In addition to these developments which changed the conditions for maintaining the shelving 
of the territorial dispute, Japanese-Chinese relations had generally been deteriorating since the 
middle of the 1990s. Japan became suspicious of China`s non-transparent military 
modernization, particularly of the navy which has been expanding its operations, including 
the East China Sea.109 Other negative developments were the progress of Chinese oil and gas 
exploration in the East China Sea despite disagreement over the common EEZ border, visits 
by Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine, and other issues related to Japan`s 
past aggression against China.  
A nadir in the bilateral relationship was reached during the rule of Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because of his annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. But while 
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the political relationship got colder, the economic relationship expanded and prospered (`Cold 
Politics, Hot Economics`). This also had – maybe at a first glance counter-intuitively – a 
deleterious effect on the motivation to work harder on maintaining the conditions for putting 
aside the territorial conflict since this dichotomy gave the false impression that politics and 
economics could be kept separate forever while the territorial issue was pending. The 
worsening of the territorial conflict from 2010, and particularly from 2012, with China`s 
harsh political and economic retribution, would bear this out. 
Part of the rationale for the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the East China Sea is 
China`s oil and gas developments, as well as the wish to keep the navy`s access to the Pacific 
Ocean less vulnerable to Japanese/US observation or interception in a crisis. This could not 
but affect the territorial dispute. In May 1999, 12 Chinese warships conducted a manoeuvre in 
waters north of the Senkaku islands. The exercise was the first of its kind to be carried out by 
China in that region.110 Other Chinese naval movements in the East China Sea increased, 
including reports about intelligence-gathering ships. In the last few years, the political 
influence of the PLA, and particularly of the PLA Navy (PLAN), has considerably 
increased.111 The Japanese reacted by increasing their military deployment and a 
strengthening of Japanese-American military cooperation. However, the Senkaku area is 
controlled by the CG which is a law enforcement agency, and the Japanese navy keeps away 
from policing. This incidentally reinforces Japan`s claim, as policing is done only within 
national territory or EEZ areas. 
Until the central government`s purchase of three of the islands in September 2012, it 
was the activities of non-state actors from Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the PRC, be it 
nationalist activists or fishermen, which caused the greatest direct confrontations because 
Japan`s countermeasures were a demonstration of the exercise of sovereignty which the PRC 
became increasingly less likely to tolerate. In 1996, a Hong Kong protester who tried to cover 
the last meters from his boat to one of the islands drowned. Another incident occurred in 2008 
when a Japanese Coast Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese sport fishing boat which had entered 
the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands. The action caused the boat to sink.112 
In March 2004, for the first time since 1996, seven Chinese activists landed on 
Uotsurijima. For the first time, the Japanese police made arrests, and the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry protested and called it a serious violation of Chinese sovereignty. The arrests were 
made under the immigration management law which includes a clause on expulsion of illegal 
foreign trespassers.113 In light of the 2010 incident, it is important to note that despite 
guidelines which were to give the law enforcement agencies the authority to deal with 
trespassers `according to the law`, it was reported that the central government intervened at 
the last minute, did not press for an indictment and ordered the release of the arrested 
Chinese. The government did not want any further complications in order not to endanger the 
planned China visit by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko, and was satisfied to have 
demonstrated effective control over the Senkaku Islands by arresting and expulsing the 
Chinese.114 A Japanese journal reported that there was a Japanese promise to China after this 
incident that in future an intruder would not be put into detention but only arrested as long as 
it was not a serious case, and that in turn China would prevent the departure of vessels with 
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protesters from its harbours. Such an understanding has not surprisingly been denied by the 
Japanese as well as by the Chinese government.115 
The China Marine Surveillance started irregular patrol activities near the Senkaku 
Islands in December 2008 when two CMS vessels stayed for over nine hours in the territorial 
waters of the Senkaku Islands as mentioned above. This was interpreted in Japan as a major 
escalation.116 Former ambassador to China, Miyamoto Yuji, called this new development a 
qualitative change in the Senkaku dispute which went beyond the previous cases of intrusion 
by fishermen or protesters.117 This deployment was followed by others in the following year 
against a background of China reinforcing its maritime control. Japan responded by building 
up its own defence efforts in the south, including the consideration of stationing some troops 
on Yonaguni Island, one of the closest islands to the Senkaku Islands. 
 
4. 2010 and 2012/13 Incidents 
4.1. The 2010 Fishing Trawler Incident 
It is against this complex background that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a 
crew of 15 entered the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands on 7 September 2010 near 
Kubajima. There were many other Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area and several ships 
of the Japanese Coast Guard were trying to chase them away. Pursued by three Japanese CG 
vessels, the Minjinyu 5179 twice collided with two of the CG vessels. There are different 
interpretations whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixiong intentionally rammed the CG 
vessels, and there are some strange inconsistencies highlighted in the reports of the 
incident.118 Some non-Japanese authors like Sheila Smith and Linus Hagström are non-
committal on the question of the collision, but most Japanese authors blame the trawler and 
this author is more inclined to believe that the ramming was intentional.119 The Chinese 
unsurprisingly blames the CG vessels.120 The issue of intention is important insofar as it gives 
some indication about the risk of recurrence and of escalation. The following circumstantial 
evidence seems to indicate intentional ramming by the Chinese captain:  
- There is ample video footage leaked by a CG officer which is interpreted by specialists as 
indicating intentional ramming by the Chinese captain.121  
- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is generally considered a volatile person. 122  
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- Fishing in the East China Sea is very competitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly 
annoyed about the patrols and controls by Japanese and Korean law enforcement agencies in 
the as yet un-demarcated EEZs among all three countries 
 
The Chinese fishermen have a reputation of often being violent, as many incidents in the 
South China Sea and in the Yellow Sea seem to prove. Only three months later, in December 
2010, another Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a South Korean coast guard vessel in 
the Yellow Sea and his boat sank as a result, with the Chinese captain drowning.123 Chinese 
crews are often armed with metal pipes and attack law enforcement agents which have led to 
other fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012.124 
The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in our context in view of the Japanese 
government`s handling it (legal aspect; denial of the shelving understanding), China`s 
countermeasures, and the aftermath of the government`s purchase of three islands in 
September 2012. After the collisions, the CG arrested the crew and confiscated the trawler. 
The following day, the Chinese government demanded the release of the crew and the trawler, 
which the Japanese government did on the 13 September, but keeping the captain in custody. 
The Japanese ambassador to China, Niwa Uichiro, was summoned six times by the Chinese 
between 8 and19 September. Beijing`s reaction escalated after the Chinese captain`s term of 
detention was extended on 19 September to last from 20 to 29 September. On 20 September, 
Chinese authorities detained four Japanese citizens for entering a restricted military area in 
Hebei province. Even without the trawler incident the detention of the four Japanese would 
have harmed the bilateral relationship, but, happening in this context, it was, rightly or 
wrongly, immediately linked by the Japanese to the other Chinese sanctions and seems to 
have been the final straw for the Japanese to release the Chinese captain.125 Even immediately 
after the crew`s arrest, the Chinese government had already begun to cancel the second round 
of the negotiations for the implementation of the understanding on energy cooperation in the 
East China Sea concluded on 18 June 2008. Other reprisals and sanctions followed, including 
the suspension of rare earth exports to Japan on which the country`s high technology industry 
is very dependent. Although, before the incident, the Chinese government had already moved 
to reduce rare earth exports, which naturally hit Japan most as the biggest importer, Japanese 
media reported that the Chinese customs authorities totally suspended exports temporarily in 
late September.126 The exact circumstances of this alleged embargo are still not yet clear as 
discussed in detail by Alastair Johnston.127 The crisis ended when the deputy prosecutor in 
Ishigaki announced on 24 September the release of the captain, citing the `diplomatic impact` 
of the case on the bilateral relationship. Some considered this ending as surrender by the 
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Japanese and the result of a dubious political interference into the legal process. The 
opposition had a field day attacking the government`s handling of the incident.128 The 
Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that the government had applied domestic 
law, and again refuted the idea of there being a territorial problem to be resolved.129 Others 
argue that the incident had several benefits for the Japanese government because it obtained a 
reconfirmation of the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Islands, it helped to 
convince the public about the necessity of more Japanese defence efforts and it exposed China 
as an assertive if not aggressive power.130  
China claimed that the incident showed that Japan had changed its approach to handling 
this type of incident and this could be interpreted as a confirmation that both sides had indeed 
reached an informal understanding after the 2004 incident.131 However, this incident was 
much more severe since the captain`s two collisions with CG ships were interpreted by the 
Japanese government as intentional ramming. The captain was charged with obstruction of 
Performance of Public Duty as a result of the ramming. On the other hand, one cannot blame 
China for allowing this boat to leave its Chinese harbour because it was a fishing trawler and 
not a protesters` campaign vessel. What made this incident so serious for the Chinese was 
Japan`s very public assertion of its sovereignty over the islands, by the way it handled the 
Chinese captain and the explicit denial of the shelving understanding of the 1970s. On 21 
September, Foreign Minister Maehara stated that it was not the case that Japan had agreed 
with China to shelve the territorial dispute.132 This declaration followed the second extension 
of the captain`s detention on 19 September which prompted the Chinese government to allow 
widespread demonstrations in China and to place a series of sanctions against Japan 
(cancellation of ministerial meetings; `self restrictions` on visits to Japan by Chinese tourists; 
postponement at very short notice of the visit of 1000 Japanese youth, planned from 21 
September, to the Shanghai World Exhibition, etc.). Japan's consumption is estimated to have 
fallen by ¥31.8 billion due to a decline in the number of Chinese tourists.133 
It is difficult to judge whether these unprecedented countermeasures were centrally 
directed or not, and it is more likely that it was a combination of various power centres 
competing and/or feeling the need to be seen acting in accordance with the increasingly anti-
Japan mood. 
Japan`s domestic circumstances made a speedy solution such as that in 2004 difficult. 
The DPJ had come to power only in 2009 and lacked foreign policy experience. There was no 
effective communication between the two governments, at least at the beginning of the 
incident, in contrast to earlier times. The Japanese leadership obviously misjudged how the 
Chinese would interpret the Japanese handling of the incident, which was perceived by China 
as a reversal of the Japan`s previous (albeit gradually) diminishing restraint. Although the 
DPJ had initially a more pro-China leadership when it came to power (notably Prime Minister 
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Hatoyama Yukio and then Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro), this had changed by 2010. The 
minister in charge of the CG (which is under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism) on the day of the incident, was Maehara Seiji, who is a known defence hawk, 
and who then became Minister of Foreign Affairs in a cabinet reshuffle on 17 September. He 
was therefore much more at liberty to take a hardline stance against China while the DPJ 
presidential election – won again by Kan Naoto – took place on 14 September, followed by 
the prime minister`s departure to New York to attend the UN General Assembly on the 22 
September. The foreign minister before the 17 September was Okada Katsuya, who was also 
more inclined to take a strong stance. Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video of 
the collision which could not but have left them with a very negative impression of the 
Chinese captain`s actions.134 It certainly did not help when Maehara, in his new post as 
foreign minister, qualified China`s reaction in the Diet on 18 September as `very hysterical`, 
and then declared on 21 September that there had never been an understanding about shelving 
the territorial dispute.135 On 23 September, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton assured visiting 
Foreign Minister Maehara that the Senkaku Islands were covered by the bilateral Japan-US 
Security Treaty, an intervention that was certainly also not welcome to the Chinese. However, 
there have been speculations that in exchange for this strong US reconfirmation of the 
security guarantee, in order to get out of the stalemate, the Japanese had to promise to release 
the Chinese captain, which happened the following day.136 
4.2. The Impact of the 2010 Incident 
The 2010 incident had several consequences which made a recurrence very likely. First of all 
the incident raised tensions to a degree last seen during the anti-Japan demonstrations in 2004 
and 2005, which had been mainly concerned with Japan`s attempt to gain a permanent UN 
Security Council seat and the history issue. These tensions had made it impossible to have any 
new negotiation round to conclude a treaty about cooperation in the exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea and thus reduce another major source of bilateral 
tensions which is moreover related to the Senkaku issue. Against this background, but also in 
line with its previous position, Japan refused a Chinese proposal made in October 2010 for 
joint resource development in the Senkaku area.137 The legal aftermath of the incident kept on 
for some time, with Japan claiming compensation from the Chinese captain for the damage 
caused to the two CG vessels, which was rejected by China and countered with demands for 
compensation and an apology. The Japanese prosecutor dropped the case against the captain 
only in January 2011, but the CG still sent a bill to the captain in February 2011.138 
While the incident helped the Japanese government to get strong US support on the 
applicability of the bilateral security treaty to the Senkaku Islands, and generally helped to 
convince the Japanese public about the need for greater Japanese defence efforts (including a 
strengthening of the US leverage vis-à-vis Japan concerning the realignment of its forces on 
Okinawa), it reduced Japan`s independence regarding the degree of support for the US China 
policy.  
                                                          
134
 Takahara, "The Senkaku Trawler Collision Incident", op. cit., p. 9. 
135
 Hagström, “Power Shift’ in East Asia? op. cit., p.276 and 285. 
136
 Kaneko, Hidetoshi: “U.S. Intervention in Japan-China fishing boat row“, Mainichi Shimbun, October 2010, at 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/news/20101008p2a00m0na001000c.html. 
137
 “China seeks, Japan nixes joint resource development near Senkakus”, Mainichi Shimbun, 22 October 2010, 
at http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20101022p2g00m0fp017000c.html. 
138
 "China spurns demand to pay for Senkaku ship collisions", Japan Times, 13 February 2011, at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110213a4.html. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 32 (Mayo / May 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
34 
Secondly, the incident further undermined the conditions which were the foundation for 
the unofficial shelving of the Senkaku issue. If it was not yet clear to everybody that there was 
a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, then this incident, with the unprecedented 
Chinese sanctions against Japan, had lifted the last remnants of doubt. Maehara Seji, who 
repeated on 25 occasions in Diet debates between 10 September and 16 November 2010, that 
there existed no territorial dispute, made this official position even less convincing.139 The 
incident prompted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territorial claim even more by 
announcing on 29 October 2010 permanent deployment of  large fisheries patrol vessels in 
waters near the Senkaku Islands, which was reciprocated by the CG deploying patrol vessels 
of over 1000 tons in the same area.140 In a further tit-for-tat, on 17 December 2010, the city 
government of Ishigaki, the administrative authority of the Senkaku Islands, passed an 
ordinance to designate 14 January the day to commemorate the Senkaku Islands` 
incorporation in 1895.141 
4.3. The Further Erosion of the Shelving Agreement after October 2010 
The next major confrontation over the Senkaku Islands in September 2012 occurred against 
the background of more measures taken by both sides to support their respective territorial 
claim, and domestic circumstances in both countries which were even less conducive to re-
establish trust and good relations. The growing US-China political and military rivalry in East 
Asia, as exemplified by the Asia pivot which China perceives as directed against its rise did 
certainly not help. Initially, the year 2011 saw a recovery of relations from the 2010 incident. 
The bilateral trade reached a new high with a volume of $345 billion. Japanese foreign direct 
investment in China soared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6.3bn.142 Moreover, the Chinese 
public was very impressed with the disciplined way the Japanese people reacted towards the 
triple disasters which hit the country on the 11 March 2011, and there was an outpouring of 
sympathy which also included the sending of a Chinese search-and-rescue mission to the 
affected Tohoku area.143 Yet, this improved atmosphere was quickly spoiled when the results 
of the textbook review were published on 27 March which asserted Japan`s territorial claim to 
the Senkaku Islands (as well as to Takeshima/Dokto) and denied the Chinese figure of 
300,000 victims in the Nanjing massacre.144 
In the meantime, the Japanese government continued to turn the legal screws which 
affected the Senkaku Islands by implementing domestic laws in order to be congruent with 
international law and strengthening maritime control. In February 2012, the Japanese cabinet 
passed bills to enhance the Japan Coast Guard's law enforcement powers in territorial waters 
which would, for example, authorize the CG to order foreign ships to leave Japan`s Territorial 
Waters without first boarding them.145 Other administrative measures derived from the Basic 
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Law on Ocean Policy, which had been enacted in 2007 and which provides the framework for 
administrating remote islands. Since 2009, Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed islands 
to clarify its claims to an EEZ. For this purpose, in August 2011, the government placed 23 
uninhabited islands under state control, but four islets near the Senkaku Islands were exempt, 
out of consideration for China. In March 2012, however, the government abandoned this 
caution and registered Kitakojima as national asset.146 In November 2011, the government 
had let it be known that it would shortly release a new list of names for islands which would 
include islets of the Senkaku group.147 China protested and a meeting in Beijing planned in 
February 2012 between President Hu Jintao and with representatives of seven bilateral 
friendship groups from Japan was cancelled. An opinion piece in the People's Daily (RMRB) 
on 17 January 2012 said Japan's move ‘is a blatant move to damage China's core interests’.148 
On 2 March 2012, Tokyo finally announced a list of 39 islands which included four islets in 
the Senkaku Islands group.149 The Chinese protested immediately on the same day and, in a 
tit-for-tat, the State Oceanic Administration released on 3 March standard names and 
descriptions of the Senkaku islands and its 70 affiliated islets.150 Another Chinese 
countermove was the announcement on 16 March by the SOA that they had started patrolling 
near the Senkaku Islands. This was followed promptly on the same day by one CMS ship 
entering the Territorial Waters of the Senkaku Islands, and the same vessels with another 
CMS ship cruising in the Contiguous Waters of the islands.151 In November 2010 an official 
of the Ministry of Agriculture's Bureau of Fisheries which operates the Fisheries Law 
Enforcement Command (FLEC) had already announced that his organization would from now 
on deploy fisheries patrol vessels of over 1000 tons to maintain continuous patrols.152 
4.4. Lighting the Fuse: Ishihara Shintaro`s Purchase Announcement  
It was in this tense environment that Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro announced on 16 
April 2012 that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) was negotiating the purchase of 
three of the four privately-held Senkaku islands by the end of the year, i.e. Uotsurijima, Kita 
Kojima and Minami Kojima. The lease of the central government for these three islands was 
due to expire in March 2013, and no incident would have happened if the government had 
quietly renewed the lease. The central government admitted that it had not known about 
Ishihara`s intention, but that there had been contacts on various occasions between the 
government and the private owner.153 This seems convincing since state ownership would 
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have provided better prevention of incidents, even more than just leasing. Taken aback by 
Ishihara`s surprise move, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the following 
day that the central government might acquire the islands `if required`, and Prime Minister 
Noda implied in a Diet speech on the 18 April that a purchase by the central government was 
one of the options. Both statements were widely reported in China.154 Ishihara had chosen his 
announcement for maximum effect on the occasion of a speech at the conservative 
Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation. He made it clear that this project was meant as a 
criticism of the DPJ-led central government, which he considered failing in its duty to 
sufficiently protect Japan`s sovereignty by saying that the central government should be 
buying the islands but that the Gaimusho was too afraid of offending China. The location of 
his announcement was meant to get stronger support from the US for Japan`s territorial 
claim.155 As we have seen above from Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s, this announcement 
was in many ways the logical conclusion of his long lasting obsession with the Senkaku 
Islands. It was the 2010 incident in particular which had encouraged him to renew his old plan 
of buying the islands after his earlier failure to do so. His good connections with the owner 
Kurihara Kunioki, who shared his nationalist tendencies, helped Ishihara to become the 
favoured purchaser.156  
The possibility of having the three islands under the control of the nationalistic governor 
of Tokyo who wanted to build facilities on the islands to strengthen Japan`s sovereignty was 
extremely unpalatable to the Noda government which feared complications with China. In a 
meeting on 18 May, Noda and his top advisers decided in principle to purchase the islands.157 
Pressure on the government increased, to pre-empt Ishihara because he was astonishingly 
successful in raising voluntary contributions from the public to buy the three islands, thus 
circumventing any legal difficulties in using Tokyo`s taxpayer money and also proving the 
popularity of his move: By 1 June he had collected 70,000 donations totaling around ¥1.01 
billion which increased to ¥1.46 billion by 6 September.158 On 27 July, the TMG ran an 
advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking for US understanding and support for the 
purchase plan.159 The TMG had to demand the central government’s permission to conduct a 
survey of the islands, which the government refused to grant on 27 August, forcing the TMG 
to conduct a survey from a ship on 2 September.160 In the end, it was the higher sum and the 
shortest delay of concluding the deal which prompted Kurihara Kunioki, who was apparently 
in some financial difficulties, to accept the central government`s offer of ¥2.05 billion ($26 
million) and to sign the contract on 11 September. This was quite an embarrassing turn for 
Ishihara. In addition he did not succeed in using the offer of his collected money to entice the 
                                                          
154
 “Tokyo gov't in talks with owners to buy Senkaku Islands: Ishihara”, Kyodo News, 15 April 2012, at 
http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2012/04/153304.html;  
Tiberghien, Yves: “Misunderstadings, Miscommunication, and mis-signaling. Senkakus through Chinese eyes”, 
The Oriental Economist, vol. 80, no. 12 (December 2012), p. 8. 
155
 “Tokyo negotiating purchase of Senkaku Islands”, NHK, 17 April 2012, at 
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20120417_23.html. 
156
 Hijikata, Shinji and Nakayama, Shozo: “Ishihara challenges Govt on territorial Issues / Plan to buy Senkaku 
Islands, a Slap at DPJ-led Administration, was hatched Months ago in Secret”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 April 2012, 
at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120418005346.htm.  
157
 “Senkaku konyu ni fumidashita”, Asahi Shimbun, 26 September 2012, pp. 1-2. 
158
 “Donations to metro government to buy Senkaku Islands top ¥1 billion” Japan Times, 2 June 2012, at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120602b4.html; Yomiuri Shimbun, at 
“Govt to buy 3 Senkaku isles for 2 billion yen”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 September 2012, at 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120905004690.htm. 
159
 “Ad in Wall Street Journal seeks U.S. support for Senkaku purchase plan”, Japan Times, 29 July 2012, at 
www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120729a2.html. 
160
 “Tokyo metro government's inspection team sets sail for Senkaku Islands” Japan Times, 02 September 2012, 
at www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120902a9.html. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 32 (Mayo / May 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
37 
Noda government to promise the building of any facility on the islands. Noda was presented 
by his administration with several options, including his favoured option of repairing the 
existing light house on Uotsurijima, but in the end was convinced by Foreign Minister Gemba 
to leave things as they were in order not to further inflame the Chinese.161  
The central government`s purchase of the three islands on 11 September immediately 
led to a very harsh reaction by the Chinese which was even worse than in 2010. But before 
looking at the Chinese countermeasures after the 11 September in detail, it is important to 
investigate why the Chinese reaction was so strong and why the Japanese apparently did not 
anticipate it, particularly in view of China`s unprecedented reaction in September 2010.  
4.5. Chinese Warnings before the Nationalization on 11 September 
Prime Minister Noda admitted on 19 September, only eight days into the comprehensive 
Chinese sanctions and counter measures that he had underestimated their extent.162 
The question arises, therefore, whether Japan could or should have anticipated the 
strong Chinese reactions, and what this incident means for the future of the territorial dispute 
and for the bilateral relationship in general. At this point, one has to rely solely on media 
reports and only some tentative conclusions are possible.  
Looking at the Chinese reactions to the Ishihara announcement on 16 April 2012 and 
afterwards, one can detect at least two stages in the intensity of Chinese warning signals. The 
initial Chinese reactions to the Ishihara announcement on 16 April 2012 were rather 
moderate, albeit firm, on the principle of China`s sovereignty claim to the islands. On 18 
April, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the islands were 
part of China and that it can exercise its sovereign right over them. He added that any 
unilateral action by Japan on the islands was invalid and could not change the fact that they 
were Chinese.163 In a named commentary of Xinhua on 18 April, attention was drawn to 
Ishihara`s known right wing and anti-Chinese statements but also pointed out that the 
CMOFA `would not hesitate to take any necessary measures to safeguard sovereignty over 
the Diaoyu Islands`.164 Vice-President Xi Jinping told visiting Kono Yohei, a known pro-
China hand, that Japan should not worsen the bilateral relationship and that core issues should 
be resolved by the two countries in an appropriate manner.165 At the end of April, the State 
Oceanic Administration announced a plan to designate islands and their surrounding waters as 
strategically vital and to protect their environments and develop marine resources.166 More 
specifically targeting the Senkaku Islands was, however, the entry on 3 May of two FLEC 
vessels into the Senkaku Islands` Contiguous Waters for the first time since Ishihara`s 
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announcement.167 Bilateral tensions also increased after a Japanese right wing group 
supported the holding of a meeting of the World Uyghur Congress in Tokyo from 14 to 18 
May, which led to the cancellation by Beijing of several official visits.168 On 13 May, Premier 
Wen Jiabao raised the Senkaku issue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with 
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, cautioning that ‘it is important to respect China’s core 
interests and matters of great concern’.169 While there might be some ambiguity whether the 
Senkaku issue was meant here to be a `core interest` or only `a matter of great concern`, 
Wang Jiarui, head of the Communist Party's International Department, was quoted by Eda 
Satsuki, a foreign policy adviser of the DPJ, that both the Senkaku and the Uighur issue were 
described as `core issues` and Wen`s statement was stressed in a Chinese TV broadcast.170 
The Xinjiang issue, as well as Taiwan and Tibet, have clearly been referred to for some time 
by the Chinese government as `core issues`, but the Senkaku issue had been called a `core 
issue` apparently for the first time only in an opinion piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 
2012.171 Only on the 23 March 2013 did the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson clearly 
state that China regards the Diaoyu Islands as its core interest although the written record 
subsequently softened this statement.172 
The above chronology gives certainly the impression that there was a series of Chinese 
reactions which expressed strong Chinese concern with any purchase (whether by the TMG or 
the central government) of the Senkaku Islands. If that had not been enough, it was the 
interview of the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassador in China, Niwa Uichiro, at the 
beginning of June which showed strong concern about the implications of a purchase. He was 
quoted as saying that ‘if Mr Ishihara’s plans are acted upon, then it will result in an extremely 
grave crisis in relations between Japan and China….We cannot allow decades of past effort to 
be brought to nothing’. He warned that such a crisis would affect business.173 Niwa must have 
been truly concerned about the severity of the situation to make such a rather undiplomatic 
public statement for which he was reprimanded by Foreign Minister Gemba and criticized by 
some media outlets and politicians, ultimately leading to his recall later in the year.174 
The Chinese warnings became sharper at the second stage when Prime Minister Noda 
announced on 7 July that his government would seek to buy the islands because now the 
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purchase could no longer be put down to a mere local maverick with strong anti-Chinese 
inclinations. The Global Times editorial of 9 July showed the frustration by some Chinese: 
‘Each time Japan takes one step, we should take one and half or even two steps forward, 
making Japan aware of the grave consequences caused by its aggression against China’.175 A 
Xinhua commentary on 7 July quotes the CMOFA`s spokesperson referring probably for the 
first time in this row to a `consensus` against which the Japanese government went by 
wanting to buy the islands, meaning of course the shelving consensus of 1972 and 1978.176 
On 9 July a Xinhua commentary titled `Japan playing with fire over Diaoyu Islands` called 
the purchase by the central government a `farcial ambition`, an expression repeated thereafter 
many times.177 On 11 July, the Japanese media reported the entry by three FLEC vessels into 
the territorial waters of Kubajima, the first time since the 16 March 2012, followed by one 
vessel cruising the following day in the island`s contiguous zone.178 Public opinion became 
also increasingly inflamed and the Global Times reported on 19 July that 90.8 per cent of 
Chinese people surveyed approve using the military to enforce China's sovereignty over the 
islets, with 52.1 per cent saying a military clash ‘is likely’ between China and Japan over the 
islands.179 
Even the US gave Japan `strong advice` not to proceed with the purchase because it 
could `trigger a crisis` as was revealed in April 2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. "Even though we warned Japan, Japan 
decided to go in a different direction, and they thought they had gained the support of China, 
or some did, which we were certain that they had not," Campbell is quoted in an interview 
with Kyodo.180 
4.6. Failure of Communication 
The above chronology and escalation of Chinese reactions to the planned purchase of the 
islands over the summer 2012 seem to give a clear indication that a Japanese purchase of the 
three islands was not considered just another incident without major consequences. So why 
did the Japanese government still go ahead with the purchase? In the final analysis, the failure 
to avoid the crisis escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the 
interests of the two governments. Domestic circumstances on both sides and the inherent zero 
sum nature of territorial disputes prevented the transition from dialogue to preventive action, 
let alone solution. Aggravating events over the summer 2012, which raised the tempers on 
both sides, were the demands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Islands (the 
Noda government after some initial conflicting reports did not allow a landing), the landing of 
Hong Kong activists on Uotsurijima on 15 August (timed with the anniversary of Japan`s 
surrender), followed by the landing of Japanese activists (including local parliamentarians) on 
19 August, and an attack in Beijing on 27 August on the car carrying Ambassador Niwa. 
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Despite ongoing communication and dialogue through various channels, these adverse 
circumstances did not help with proper communication over the summer 2012 between two 
very different governance systems.  
The Japanese central government had been caught short by Ishihara`s sudden 
announcement on 16 April, and became totally absorbed with preventing the maverick 
politician from going ahead with the purchase of the islands, fearing rightly that he would 
seriously complicate the Japanese-Chinese relationship. Ishihara wanted to embarrass the 
Noda government which was constantly losing percentage points in popularity, and to force 
its hands to deal more assertively with the islands. As we have seen, for Ishihara it was not 
just about purchasing the islands, but about building facilities on them. For the Noda 
government, buying the islands by the state was therefore the lesser evil. The government 
tried all along to convince the Chinese of Tokyo`s good intentions, for example, when 
Foreign Minister Gemba met with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi on 11 July, that the 
purchase was only a `domestic commercial transaction` and not a diplomatic matter, and was 
only meant to ensure that the islands would be `administered  peacefully and stably`.181 In 
December 2012, when the full extent of China`s unprecedented reactions had become known, 
the new Japanese ambassador Kitera still stated that ‘The change in ownership should not 
have caused a problem in relations with China’, adding that Japan had given China sufficient 
explanations ahead of the purchase.182 Foreign Minister Gemba even tried to highlight in 
November that the purchase was actually a return to the status quo ante: ‘The measure taken 
by the government of Japan was just a transfer of title under Japanese domestic law and just 
means that the ownership of the islands — held by the government until 1932 — was returned 
from a private citizen to the government’.183 In short, for the Japanese, the purchase of the 
islands was aimed at maintaining the status quo which China should consider to be also in its 
own interest. That expressions like `peaceful administration`, or `transfer of title under 
domestic Japanese law` could only be interpreted by the Chinese as acts of asserting Japanese 
sovereignty was apparently simply ignored. Under these circumstances it was impossible to 
convince the Chinese that transfer of ownership had nothing to do with sovereignty. Instead, 
the Chinese even suspected that the Noda government and Ishihara were conniving at 
strengthening Japan`s control over the islands.184  
Any intended conciliatory overtone in the above explanations by Gemba and many 
similar declarations before and later were further negated by the insistence that there was no 
territorial dispute, exactly the position the Chinese wanted to change. The frequent references 
to `core interest` by China were ignored by the Japanese government. For the Chinese leaders, 
the `offer` to choose between the Tokyo Metropolitan Government or the Government of 
Japan buying the islands was, as Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun later put it, like being 
asked to choose between two doses of poison.185  
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It was also unfortunate that the Japanese government allowed the expression kokuyuka 
(nationalization) to prevail, even among government members, instead of the original term 
agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquisition).186 Chinese media has taken over the 
Japanese term of ‘nationalization’ which certainly further confused Chinese public opinion. 
Since it does not know the historical background and Japan`s effective control of the islands, 
`nationalization` tended to be understood as a radical change in the status quo or even as 
invasion.187 A well known Japanese observer in China, Kato Yoshikazu even argued therefore 
that the 1972 and 1978 understanding about shelving had prevented the Chinese people from 
learning about the issue.188 
Both sides made it impossible with their extreme and diametrically opposed positions to 
find a compromise. The Noda government was too weak (and also too preoccupied with other 
issues like the passing of the law to introduce a hike of the value added tax, coping with the 
aftermath of the triple disaster of March 2011 and simply trying to stay in power) to find an 
alternative to the now abandoned `shelving compromise` and to admit that there was a 
territorial problem. At the end of August, Noda was forced to promise Lower House elections 
`sometime soon` despite the grim outlook for his party`s chances in the elections. Making a 
compromise on the territorial issue would not have helped to gain popular support. While the 
Chinese probably felt encouraged to escalate its pressure by its success in making the 
Japanese government hand over the captain in September 2010, it most likely had the effect 
on the Noda government to stay inflexible in order to avoid being seen yet again as caving in 
to Chinese pressure. But the Chinese were also not able to compromise on their demand that 
the Japanese should admit the existence of a territorial issue. The preparation for the 18th 
National Party Congress in November 2012, and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized 
only in spring 2013, similarly did not allow the Chinese leaders whether in or outgoing, to 
appear soft. Eight out of nine Politbureau members publicly expressed their opposition to the 
purchase either before or after the announcement of the purchase on 11 September.189 Public 
opinion in China had grown increasingly hostile to Japan over the summer and was 
particularly inflamed when the landing of the Hong Kong activists was followed by the 
landing of Japanese activists which were treated by the Japanese authorities more leniently 
than the former, i.e. not arrested despite having violated private land leased to the state. Riots 
in several Chinese cities started thereafter.190 
Although both sides agreed to continue dialogue, and several official meetings at 
different levels took place, they could only end in restating known positions. China did not 
make things easier by later cancelling such meetings, depriving both sides of possible 
opportunities to find a breakthrough. The start of Chinese sanctions across the whole gambit 
of bilateral relations deprived the Japanese of even more domestic wriggle room for a 
compromise. 
It seems that the above circumstances did not allow Japan`s central decision-makers 
concerned with the issue, in particular the Prime Minister and his immediate circle, to admit 
to and/or understand until the purchase announcement on 11 September 2012, how strongly 
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the Chinese felt about it. Ambassador Niwa`s rather undiplomatic statements in the Financial 
Times interview seem to indicate that he felt that the central decision-makers did not 
understand the strength of the feelings of the Chinese and how far they might go. Niwa 
warned in his interview that even a possible pre-purchase survey of the islands could be 
diplomatically incendiary, since such a survey was discussed already at the time to enable the 
TMG to go ahead with the purchase.191 As late as the 3 September, the Yomiuri Shimbun 
reported that the Chinese government was reacting calmly as long as three conditions were 
observed to maintain the status quo, but the conditions contained no opposition to a possible 
purchase and instead just mentioned abstention from landing, surveying and building facilities 
on the islands.192 For now, one can only speculate whether the government was misled by 
such reports. However, in view of the growing diffusion of power in China`s policymaking, it 
is also conceivable that the CMOFA (or other Chinese communicators) was trying to send out 
more conciliatory signals, but not having the same power as other policy-making institutions, 
sent in this way a wrong message to Japan. According to Professor Takahara Akio, General 
Zhu Chenghu said on 5 September that a purchase by the central government would be better 
and Qu Xing, director of the China Institute of International Affairs is said to have expressed 
a similar opinion.193 The above Campbell interview seems to suggest that Japan was more 
inclined to act upon Chinese statements which were closer to what it wanted to understand. 
4.7. The Chinese Reaction: Rhetoric Warfare 
The final miscommunication or clash of irreconcilable interests occurred when Prime Minister 
Noda met President Hu on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Vladivostok on 9 September but announced two days later the signing of the 
purchase contract with the Kurihara family. According to one account Hu did not want to 
meet Noda in Vladivostok, but the Japanese embassy in Beijing told later some Chinese that 
Hu had wanted to meet Noda.194Whatever the circumstances were or the reason for either Hu 
not sufficiently conveying his strong feelings concerning the purchase, which had been known 
and bilaterally discussed at least since the Japanese official announcement of its purchase 
intention on 7 July, or for Noda not understanding the Chinese feeling for the possible reasons 
discussed above, Hu apparently felt he had lost face when Japan announced the purchase on 
11 September.195 Moreover, the Japanese announcement could not have come at a more 
awkward time because of the anniversary of the Mukden Incident on the 18 September which, 
like several other carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s past misdeeds in China, 
always arouse latent anti-Japanese feelings. As a result, the Japanese announcement caused an 
avalanche of virulent rhetoric outbursts relating to the past, political sanctions, further 
measures to assert China`s territorial claim (for example, including the islands in the Chinese 
TV weather forecast; an exhibition of ancient maps to prove Chinese control), economic 
sanctions, and an escalation of patrols by Chinese FLEC and MSA ships and aircraft around 
the Senkaku Islands. 
The mildest part of China`s rhetoric avalanche was calling the government`s purchase a 
`farce`, a rather undiplomatic expression already used by Xinhua in July 2012, but then taken 
up at the highest level by Vice President Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary of Defence Leon 
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Panetta on 19 September.196 But the main line from now on was that Japan`s claim to the 
Senkaku Islands was a denial of the post-World War II results. In its statements and rebuttals 
the Chinese showed their frustration at not having been able to fundamentally change the 
status quo and they did not hesitate to use expressions which were rather undignified for 
diplomats and political leaders. Japan on the other hand argued for peaceful resolution along 
the lines of international law and dialogue which probably infuriated the Chinese even more. 
On 10 September, the CMFA issued a statement where it called Japan's position on the 
disputed islands `an outright denial of the outcomes of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist 
War and … a grave challenge to the post-war international order`.197 In a heated exchange at 
the UN General Assembly between China's UN ambassador Li Baodong and Japan's Deputy 
UN ambassador Kodama Kazuo, Li called the motive for purchasing the three islands to 
‘legalize its stealing and occupation of the Chinese territory’ and stated, ‘This action of Japan 
constitutes a serious encroachment upon China's sovereignty, and intends to continue and 
legalize the result of Japan's colonial policy. It is an open denial of the outcomes of victory of 
the world anti-fascist war, and a grave challenge to the post-war international order and the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.198 In a further rebuttal of 
Japan`s assertion of its claim, Li characterized the island purchase as ‘nothing different from 
money laundering’.199 At the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Laos Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi repeated the reference to the `outcome of the anti-Fascist war` while Prime Minister 
Noda spoke of peaceful resolution of conflicts according to international law.200 On 11 
October, the CMFA spokesperson Hong Lei refuted Foreign Minister Gemba historical 
account justifying Japan`s claim by calling it `gangster logic`.201 
On the Chinese side, therefore, there are now two closely-linked history narratives: one 
is about the islands having been part of China since the Ming and Qing dynasties, the other 
connects the islands to what is the better known history narrative, i.e. Japan having victimised 
China since 1894 and as part of its imperialism annexed the islands. These two narratives 
continue to be cultivated by the Chinese leadership. In October 2012, the Chinese 
announcement of the publication of 80 volumes on the Far East War Criminal Court was 
clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquisition of the Senkaku Islands.202 
Former Foreign Minister Gemba explicitly tried in October 2012 to delink the territorial issue 
from Japan`s aggression against China, only to be reminded by the Chinese ambassador to the 
UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part of the ensuing worldwide press campaign by 
both sides) that ‘the Diaoyu Dao issue is all about history’.203 
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4.8. Political Sanctions 
Chinese political countermeasures ranged from the cancellation of official and unofficial 
visits to further legal acts to reinforce China`s claim to the Senkaku Islands. Around 40 per 
cent of ceremonial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40th anniversary of the normalization 
of diplomatic relations with China were cancelled or postponed, and even more events in 
China.204 These cancellations were not always the result of direct government intervention, 
but sometimes more indirect official `discouragement`, helped by the Chinese preference of 
not being seen to do something in contradiction to the (initially fomented and later self-
propelling) anti-Japan atmosphere, or by fear of participants of running into demonstrations if 
not assaults. The legal screws were further turned with long-term implications: On 10 
September, the Chinese government announced the base points and baselines of the territorial 
waters of the disputed islands and their affiliated islets, as well as the names and coordinates 
of 17 base points.205 On 16 September, reports appeared that China was submitting proposals 
for its extended continental shelf to the UN Continental Shelf Commission which included the 
Senkaku Islands, but in fact the actual submission occurred only on 14 December 2012.206 On 
20 September, a government agency published a thematic map of the Diaoyu Island and its 
affiliated islands.207 China’s Meteorological Administration started providing weather 
forecasts for the Senkaku area on the state-run TV station.208 On 16 September, the fishery 
bureau announced the lifting of the fishery ban in the East China Sea and stressed that China 
planned to strengthen its sovereignty claim over the Senkakus.209  
There were rumours that 1000 fishing vessels would come to the Senkaku area and 
though this did not materialize, it helped to further raise tensions.210 
Most attention in Japan was focused on the widening street protests in over 100 Chinese 
cities, the destruction of Japanese shops, restaurants, cars and production facilities and the 
attacks on Japanese citizens in China.211 The websites of at least 19 Japanese banks, 
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universities and other institutions came under cyber-attack.212 At a demonstration in 
Shanghai, about 7,000 protesters chanted slogans such as ‘Beat Japanese imperialism’, 
‘Boycott Japanese products’ and ‘Destroy Japan and retrieve Okinawa’.213 
Although only 63 per cent of polled Japanese expressed their support for their 
government`s nationalization of the islands, down from 73 per cent in a previous poll on 15 
and 16 September, 82 per cent of respondents in a Mainichi Shimbun survey said the Japanese 
government had not protested strongly enough to Beijing over anti-Japan protests.214 The 
Chinese government denied any official involvement and the spokesperson of the Waijiaobu 
went only as far as saying that the protests and demonstrations were `completely caused by 
the Japanese government's illegal "purchase" of the Diaoyu Islands and are people's 
spontaneous acts`.215 There were, however, reports that some of the demonstrations were 
tolerated, if not abetted, by government agencies.216 The demonstrations soon died down 
because tolerating them much longer would have run the risk that they would turn into anti-
government demonstrations. Even the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported that 
some demonstrators who were arrested did not even know where the Senkaku Islands were 
and that anger over the widening wealth gap was behind their acts.217 In contrast to these 
Chinese demonstrations and acts of lawlessness, there was hardly any public demonstration in 
Japan, which shows the relative detachment of the Japanese from the dispute. On 22 
September, `Nippon Gambare`, a right wing organization chaired by former Air Self Defence 
Force chief Tamogami Toshio, staged a march through parts of Tokyo which this author 
witnessed. A brief fire was started at a Chinese school in Kobe and two smoke bombs were 
thrown into the Chinese Consulate General in Fukuoka.218 
4.9. Economic Sanctions 
Protest measures of a longer duration and as yet unpredictable consequences for the bilateral 
relationship have been China`s economic sanctions and a boycott of Japanese goods by the 
general public, although the authorities denied again any government intervention. A 
commentary of Xinhua half admitted, however, government intervention when it made the 
unconvincing difference between `measures` and `sanctions`: `Since Japan "purchased" 
China's Diaoyu Islands in September, the Chinese government has taken a series of 
countermeasures in the economic, legal, diplomatic and military fields, which have helped it 
to wrest the initiative to resolve the islands dispute. ...despite China not imposing any 
economic sanctions, the Japanese economy has been badly hit`.219 The Renmin Ribao 
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compared `economic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that through its island purchase 
Japan had already touched the `trigger`. In a rather heavy hint, the paper pointed out how 
vulnerable Japan`s economy was because of the 2011 earthquake and the dependence of key 
economic sectors on China.220 Even more official was Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang 
Zengwei`s warning that the island purchase would inevitably have a negative impact on Sino-
Japanese economic and trade ties.221  
After the 11 September, it soon became very obvious that the heavy hand of the Chinese 
government was imposing sanctions and making life for Japanese business more difficult. On 
21 September, it was reported that Chinese customs authorities were strengthening 
inspections of imports from and exports to Japan, but this was denied by the Chinese 
authorities.222 In the same week, reports appeared about Japanese companies experiencing 
delays in obtaining working visas for their Japanese employees.223 Big Japanese companies 
with investments in China were experiencing hold-ups in gaining regulatory approvals for 
Merger & Acquisitions.224 In contrast to the interference in rare earth exports to Japan after 
the trawler incident in 2010, however, no such embargo was implemented, because this 
particular economic weapon had lost its effectiveness since then (see below).225 
The greatest damage to Japanese economic activities, apart from the above mentioned 
destruction of Japanese commercial and industrial sites, was caused by a partial consumer 
boycott, notably the fall of car sales in China and Chinese tourism to Japan. Overall, bilateral 
trade decreased by 3.9 per cent in 2012 to $329 billion, the first drop since the collapse of the 
Lehman investment bank in 2009.226 The worst hit sector is automobiles: Toyota sold 840,500 
vehicles in China in 2012, the first annual drop since 2002. Nissan experienced a 24 per cent 
drop in December China sales, and Honda saw a 19 per cent December fall.227 In November 
2012, it was announced that, compared with the previous year, Toyota`s production in China 
fell by 61.1 per cent, Nissan`s production by 44 per cent , Honda`s by 54.2 per cent and 
Mitsubishi Motors by 84.6 per cent .228 This has a strong effect on the individual car makers, 
given that China accounts for 25 per cent of Nissan's net profit, 21 per cent of Toyota's and 16 
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per cent of Honda's.229 However, the figures seem to be recovering since the beginning of 
2013. The tourist industry has also been hard hit in both countries. Chinese visitors to Japan 
decreased by 44 per cent from September to December 2012 from the year before.230 The 
number of Japanese tourists on group tours to China plunged by more than 70 per cent year-
on-year in the last three months of 2012, and this downward trend is continuing in 2013.231 
The effect of China`s economic retributions highlight the extent to which Japan has 
become dependent on its economic exchanges with China and cast doubt on the continued 
viability of the earlier `Hot Economics and Cold Politics` dichotomy. The answer to the 
question which country is more dependent on the other, or more vulnerable to sanctions, is 
dependent on the economic indicators and sectors being chosen and is also a political question 
because the answer can be politically manipulated. Japan`s economic difficulties since the 
1990s (and its dependence on economic interaction with China to cope with these 
difficulties!), and China pushing Japan to No. 3 in world GDP ranking has diminished the 
Chinese perception of Japan as an economic power house. It means that, for China, the 
relationship with Japan became less important while political relations deteriorated at the 
same time. The strong effect of the Chinese embargo on rare earth exports to Japan in 2010 
can be viewed in two diametrically opposed ways. Chinese observers may be inclined to put 
emphasis on the strong effect it immediately had on Japanese public opinion and industrial 
circles, contributing to a certain extent to the government`s surrender of the trawler captain. 
Others may point out that the case demonstrated the futility of abusing a dominant supplier 
position because even within a short time, the farsighted accumulation of high stocks of rare 
earth by Japan`s industry, followed after the embargo by securing alternative resources, and 
demand reduction through recycling and product re-engineering not only provided enough 
breathing space, but in the end reduced China`s market power. Still, Chinese experts are 
convinced that Japan is now more dependent on China than the other way round. According 
to some experts, China's imports accounted in 2011for 23.7 per cent of Japan`s exports 
volume. The bilateral trade volume in 2011 took up 21 per cent of Japanese gross trade 
volume of that year, while it merely accounted for 9.4 per cent of China's annual gross trade 
volume.232 There seem to be only few voices which express concern over the negative impact 
of China`s sanction on China`s economy itself, notably at a time of worldwide economic 
contraction.233  
The Chinese market is certainly too important for many Japanese companies to leave. A 
survey in November 2012 to which more than 10,000 Japanese companies in China replied 
showed that for almost 30 per cent of them the territorial dispute had affected their business, 
but still more than half want to maintain their operations, and only 16 per cent said that they 
wanted to either cut back or pull out.234 This is also borne out by the FDI figures: in 2011, 
Japanese FDI to China had increased by 55 per cent, but in 2012, by `only` 16.3 per cent to 
                                                          
229
 “Factory shift to non-Chinese sites seen accelerating. Companies reopen as anger eases in China”, Japan 
Times, 21 September 2012, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nb20120921a1.html. 
230
 “Chinese visitors fall since September”, Japan Times, 17 January 2013, at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20130117b4.html. 
231
 “Tour travelers to China down by over 70 per cent”, NHK, at 
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20130124_11.html. 
232
 “China Focus: Diaoyu Islands rift takes toll on China-Japan economic, trade ties”, Xinhua News, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-09/25/c_131872368.htm. 
233
 Ding, Gang: “Spat costs Sino-Japanese business dear”, Global Times, 5 December 2012, at 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/748399.shtml. 
234
 Nakata, Hiroko: “Not all, but sundry find niche in China”, Japan Times, 4 January 2013, at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/01/04/news/not-all-but-sundry-find-niche-in-china/. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 32 (Mayo / May 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
48 
$7.4 billion.235 Although Japanese car sales seem to be increasing again, Chinese car dealers, 
worried about a repeat of the boycott, are decreasing with long term implications.236 Japanese 
companies in certain sectors are likely to become more reluctant to make investments in 
China, all the more as other Southeast Asian countries (notably, Myanmar is currently the 
New Frontier for Japanese business!) have cheaper labour costs.237 However, Chinese 
consumers still prefer Japanese products for safer food, drinks and daily necessities, and those 
Japanese companies were hardly affected by the boycott.238 
A wide gap between both sides` perception about their economic dependence and 
vulnerability to sanctions is dangerous for the management of their bilateral relationship, 
particularly when one side tries to leverage its supposedly stronger position to achieve victory 
in a sensitive area like territorial integrity. While Chinese commentators and experts may be 
inclined to overrate Japan`s vulnerability, their Japanese counterparts have a tendency to look 
at the issues too much in purely economic terms, neglecting the impact of Chinese emotions 
and government propaganda, as well as the wider public`s insufficient knowledge about the 
overall impact of bad economic relations with Japan on China`s own economy.239 The 
Japanese perception has been lingering on until today that China in the end needs Japan more 
than the other way round, which, in view of China`s huge problems or its dependence on 
Japanese high technology components for its manufacturing industry, is arguably the case. 
This Japanese perception has fostered the conviction, as is, for example, demonstrated by the 
belief in the sustainability of `Hot Economics and Cold Politics`, that, despite recurring 
political crises in the relationship, China would, in the end, compromise, as it had done 
several times in the past.240 Yet the problem with the perception of `needing Japan` is, that it 
can be politically manipulated, particularly in an authoritarian system. This gap between 
Japanese and Chinese observers and experts on the issue of dependence can seriously 
influence the willingness of both sides to compromise.241 It also challenges the liberal view 
that close economic relations can prevent, or at least soften, deep political differences like 
territorial conflicts which, moreover, are linked to economic interests like hydrocarbon 
resources. 
4.10. From Policing to Military Involvement 
The most serious consequences for the bilateral relationship – let alone for the solution of the 
territorial dispute – may arise from the constant intrusions of Chinese official vessels into the 
Contiguous Zone (CZ) or even Territorial Waters (TW) of the Senkaku Islands since 
September 2012 and the growing involvement of the armed forces of both sides. The aim of 
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the Chinese is obvious: to demonstrate that the Japanese can no longer claim de facto control 
of the islands and to force Tokyo to admit the existence of a territorial dispute. Apparently, a 
task force at the highest level, headed by Xi Jinping, was set up in September 2012 to achieve 
this goal through escalating pressure.242 So far law enforcement actions by Japan in the 
Senkaku area had been limited to the deployment of the Japanese Coast Guard and police, 
which is now, however, constantly challenged by the Chinese with patrols by CMS and FLEC 
vessels asserting the same rights in the islands` CZ and TW. The Chinese escalated its 
pressure on Japan by first deploying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW of the disputed islands, 
then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels doing the same, followed later in 
December 2012 with air patrols by CMS, which led to the deployment of the air force of both 
sides in January 2013.  
As we have seen, after the September 2010 incident, in November 2010 FLEC started to 
regularly send its vessels to the Senkaku area, which entered from time to time the islands` 
CZ and also, in August 2011, twice the TW. Apparently, the more serious intrusions which 
are those into the TW were sometimes timed with specific spikes of tensions, such as the TW 
incursion on 16 March 2012 (the Japanese naming of some islands), July 2012 (Noda`s 
announcement of purchase intention on 7 July) and finally on 19 September, when six vessels 
entered the TW, starting a series of more frequent and regular incursions. In December 2012, 
FLEC deployed its newest and biggest ship, the 5,800-ton FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206., a 
former ship of the Chinese navy.243 
The entries of the vessels of the CMS into the islands` CZ and TW seem meant to send 
an even higher degree of warning and denial of Japan`s control over the islands. On 17 
September, the number of FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the record 
of 17.244 Since then the frequency of incursions into the CZ and TW increased but decreased 
after March 2013. On 30 October, Xinhua even reported that the CMS had `expelled a number 
of Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters around the Diaoyu Islands` although it is not 
clear what exactly this meant since the CG did not confirm such an incident.245 By 17 May 
2013, the CMS and FLEC vessels had entered the TW for the 45th time since the 11 
September announcement.246 
A new level of depriving Japan of the ability to claim sole actual control over the 
islands was reached on 13 December 2012 when a small turboprop aircraft of the CMS 
(Harbin Y12 type) flew over Uotsurijima.247 Since then, regular CMS air patrols have been 
conducted but the aircraft normally stay about 120 km from the islands. With this move, the 
Chinese measures to undermine Japan`s control over the islands were expanded to the air 
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space which, for organizational reasons, had immediately military implications because only 
the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) is responsible for intercepting aircraft which intrude 
illegally into Japan`s air space. The incident did not happen out of the blue because already in 
January 2012, the SOA had announced a plan to deploy the Y12 in `2012`.248 On 24 
September, the SOA had also announced plans to deploy drones by 2015 following the 
successful test the previous day.249 
The low altitude flight of the Y12 on 13 December was particularly upsetting for the 
Japanese government because it was not picked up by the ASDF radar (the closest one being 
on Miyakojima, about 200 km from the islands) but instead by CG ships in the area. In this 
case, eight ASDF fighters scrambled but could not anymore detect the Y12. Interception of 
aircraft is by nature much more difficult and carries a certain risk of accident, as happened in 
2001 when a US intelligence aircraft collided with a Chinese interceptor jet. Without 
explaining the standard Japanese proceedings for aerial defence,which solely relies on the 
ASDF, the Chinese media interpreted the use of military aircraft by Japan as `aggressive` and 
the Global Times cautioned against any interception, warning that otherwise China may 
respond by sending its air force.250 On the Japanese side, even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun 
called the Y12 flight ` a highly provocative act that could lead to an armed conflict between 
the two countries`.251 At the beginning of January 2013, there were apparently erroneous 
reports that the ASDF may consider firing warning shots (tracer bullets) at intruding Chinese 
aircraft which prompted further bellicose comments in the Chinese press.252 As a 
consequence, the Chinese air force also became involved: on 10 January, when the Chinese 
Ministry of Defence announced that the People`s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAA) had sent 
two fighter jets against two ASDF F-15 interceptors because they were following a Chinese 
military Y8 transport aircraft which was patrolling the airspace of Chinese oil platforms in the 
East China Sea.253 The Japanese reported that more than ten Chinese aircraft, including 
military aircraft, had approached the Japanese air defence identification zone.254 Another 
worrying development is the enhanced patrolling of the PLAA over the East China Sea which 
caused the ASDF to increase scrambling against PLAA aircraft to 91 times within the 
October-December 2012 period, whereas the total for the same period of the previous year 
was 140 times.255 
With these escalating deployments, the Chinese side certainly achieved its goal of 
showing that the Japanese authorities are no longer in full control of the disputed islands. In 
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the case of CMS or FLEC vessel intrusions, the reaction of the Japanese CG is limited to 
shadowing the Chinese vessels, to inform them that they are violating Japan`s CZ or TW, and 
to ask them to leave which, however, they do at their own discretion (the time span hovering 
in the CZ or TW has become a further means of Chinese pressure!), followed by diplomatic 
protests. Otherwise, the CG has avoided any physical confrontation or contact. When 
confronted by the CG, the Chinese vessels simply declare (by radio or even electronic 
displays) that they are patrolling Chinese waters and that the CG ships were operating 
illegally in these waters. This ritual has so far prevented any violence. This is in contrast to an 
exchange of water cannon salvos between the CG and the Taiwanese coast guard in the 
territorial of the Senkaku Islands on 25 September 2012 and again on 24 January 2013.256  
The increase of patrols by Japan and China is causing operational strain for both sides 
(also raising the risk of miscalculations or overreactions) but this has not reduced the 
willingness of either government to scale down the almost daily demonstration of `effective 
control`. In October, it was reported that the CG now always has ten vessels against eight 
from China.257 The 11th regional headquarter responsible for the Senkaku area is in Naha and 
has nine patrol ships (but only seven vessels of at least 1,000 tons) but now needs additional 
ships which are dispatched from other regional coast guard headquarters.258. In April 2012, 
the CG had a total of 357 patrol vessels, but only 51 over 1,000 tons which are those most 
needed for a far flung area like the Senkaku Islands.259 On 14 September 2012, Senior Vice 
Minister of Fisheries Iwamoto Tsukasa mentioned plans to increase the number of fishery 
patrol vessels to ensure fishermen's safety amid intensifying territorial disputes with China 
and South Korea.260 On 26 October, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism, which heads the CG, announced plans to bring budgetary requests for more ships 
forward.261 The Abe government plans to build more vessels or advance the calendar than 
originally planned, retrofit vessels which were to be retired, and considers extending the 
retirement age of the officers.262  
The Chinese have even fewer vessels which can be deployed as far as the Senkaku 
Islands. In addition, leave of the sailors has been restricted, and their deployment length at sea 
has increased.263 In March 2013 the Chinese side announced closer cooperation between the 
military and various maritime law enforcement agencies, as well as the merger of four 
maritime law enforcement agencies under the State Ocean Administration (administered by 
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the Ministry of Land and Resources), i.e. the China Marine Surveillance, the coast guard 
forces of the Public Security Ministry, the fisheries law enforcement command of the 
Agriculture Ministry and the maritime anti-smuggling police of the General Administration of 
Customs.264 This will likely enhance the Chinese control of its surrounding seas or at least 
provide better coordination. 
There has also been a gradual involvement of the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime 
Self Defence Force (MSDF). The Japanese MOD announced on the 16 October that, for the 
first time, PLAN ships were observed navigating in the 22-km-wide CZ between Yonaguni 
and Iriomote islands, although the ministry left open the possibility that they did so in order to 
avoid a typhoon. Nevertheless the Gaimusho sought explanations from the Chinese about 
these ship movements.265. In December 2012 four PLAN ships sailed through the CW of the 
Iromoto-Yonaguni islands on the way back from drills in the Pacific, after having gone into 
the Pacific through the more normal route of the strait between the Okinawa main island and 
Miyakojima.266 Again, there was nothing illegal about it, but it raised attention at a time of 
tensions. However, there are signs of greater cooperation of the PLAN with CMS and FLEC 
vessels as was shown in the standoff between China and the Philippines around the disputed 
Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea and joint exercises took place between the three in 
the East China Sea in October 2012.267. The patrolling activities of the MSDF in the Senkaku 
area became known when the Japanese reported at the end of January 2013 that, on 19 
January, a Chinese frigate’s target radar had locked onto an MSDF helicopter and, on 30 
January, another frigate sailing close to an MSDF destroyer did likewise. The Chinese 
vehemently denied it. .268 However, in March this year the Kyodo news agency reported that 
senior Chinese military officials had admitted the incident of 29 January. Even more 
worrisome is that the Chinese vessels acted apparently without prior approval from the fleet 
command or navy headquarters. All this was again denied by the Chinese side.269 It did not help that under 
Prime Minister Noda the MSDF had been ordered after the eruption of the 2012 crisis to keep 
a greater distance from PLAN ship than the hitherto 3 km in order avoid incidents, but this 
policy was revised by the more hawkish Abe administration to the previous 3 km distance.270 
The fire radar locking incident had happened at a distance of 3 km. 
The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and coordinated since the officials in 
the above Kyodo report also said that the airspace violations on 13 December 2012 by an 
airplane of the CMS was planned by the staff section of the national Land and Sea Border 
Defense Committee, which acts as a liaison office for the Chinese military, the State Oceanic 
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Administration and the fishing bureau of the Agriculture Ministry, with the aim of raising 
tensions.271 
Against the background of greater involvement of military forces, it is particularly 
regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaison mechanism between their defense authorities 
on which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved.272 Unfortunately 
it is still Chinese practice to consider Confidence Building Measures (CBM) not as the first 
step to build confidence, but as a tool to extract from the other side prior concessions under 
the pretext of `creating a better atmosphere` for discussing CBM. The outbreak of the 
September 2012 crisis was therefore a convenient pretext for the Chinese to cancel the 
project. The latest confirmation was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that 
there could be no military trust if the political and diplomatic relationship is bad.273 Since the 
target radar lock-on incidents, the Japanese government is publicly calling for resumption of 
negotiations for the maritime liaison mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract 
some concessions before even considering a positive response.  
4.11. How Far are China`s Demands Going? 
The current confrontation is still continuing, notably in the economic as well as law 
enforcement/military arena, whereas the 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release of 
the captain. One reason for this difference is certainly the fact that China`s demand in 2010 
was relatively clear and achievable (release of the captain) if painful for Japan and 
confronting a weak and inexperienced government. This time, the crisis has first hit a 
government which reacted intransigently because of its previous defeat, and other 
unfavourable domestic circumstances, and was then replaced by the more hawkish Abe 
government. China`s aim now is less clear: Would it be satisfied with going back to the 
`understanding about setting aside the dispute` and Japan`s recognition of the existence of a 
territorial dispute, or does it even demand a reversal of the purchase of the three islands? Does 
it demand the end of Japanese CG patrols around the islands? China`s demand of  Japan to 
`correct its mistakes`, is rather ambiguous because it could be interpreted as going back to the 
shelving understanding and the recognition of the existence of a dispute, or demanding a 
reversal of the government`s purchase of the islands.274 The latter would simply be impossible 
in legal and practical terms and one can only hope that the ambiguity is only aimed at raising 
China`s negotiation position and/or leaving enough wriggle room for negotiations which 
would satisfy all Chinese stakeholders` interests. 
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It seems that it is already too late for going back to the shelving agreement of 
1972/1978 which would imply that the two sides can somehow go back to the status quo of 
the 1970s which, as we have seen, has been superseded by deeds and words on both sides. 
The Chinese have now not only gone to publicly declaring the shelving agreement having 
been ‘broken’ by Japan, but after the first Y12 patrol on 13 December 2012, commenting that 
Japan`s administrative control over the Senkaku Islands now no longer existed. The bilateral 
relationship has deteriorated to the extent that at least shelving the conflicting sovereignty 
claims without officially admitting that there is a territorial dispute is no longer an option 
acceptable to China, because it feels Japan has abused the shelving consensus through a series 
of administrative measures, with the final straw having been the central government’s 
purchase of three islands. When studying the various Chinese official statements and news 
reports after the 2012 crisis had fully erupted in September, it becomes clear that until 
October 2012, the Chinese still raised the demand that Japan should go back to the previous 
‘understanding’ or ‘consensus’. However, since then, this demand has been dropped, until it 
briefly reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui, the head of the Communist party's International 
Department, when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo, the leader of the junior coalition partner 
Komeito, in January 2013.275 Before, a comment on the Xinhua internet site on 29 October 
said that ‘The ‘purchase’ showed that the Japanese government has wholly abandoned the 
attitude of laying aside disputes and has fundamentally changed the situation.276 On the 30 
October, the CMOFA spokesperson declared that ‘Japan's illegal "purchase" of the Diaoyu 
Islands broke the important consensus...The Japanese side should not have any more illusion 
of occupying the Diaoyu Islands. What the Japanese side should do is to face up to the reality, 
admit the sovereignty dispute, correct mistakes and come back to the track of a negotiated 
settlement`.277 
The recognition of a territorial problem would be relatively easy for Japanese public 
opinion (and even more so for Japan’s friends and allies) to accept because they would not see 
the need for any kind of diplomatic sophistry for what is obviously a territorial conflict 
whatever the legitimacy of the Chinese claim might be, given also the fact that the current 
Japanese position comes down to refusing to even discuss whatever settlement might be 
possible. According to a survey conducted by Genron together with Zhongguo Ribaoshe in 
June 2012, 62.7 per cent of Japanese agreed that there exists a territorial problem.278 
However, consecutive Japanese cabinets have refused to recognise the existence of a 
territorial dispute, which is often the default position of a government in actual control of a 
disputed territory (for example, the Korean government’s position on Takeshima/Dokto). This 
position has been reinforced by the explicit Japanese denial since the 1990s of a shelving 
agreement which would have been an implicit admission that there is a dispute. To 
circumvent the risk of being perceived as admitting the existence of a territorial problem, the 
deputy prime minister of the previous Noda government, Okada Katsuya, was reported to 
have mentioned in a speech in October 2012 that there was no territorial dispute but as a 
matter of fact a debate existed.279 However, this compromise solution was never confirmed by 
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the Noda government and did not become policy. It is even less likely to be acceptable to the 
new Abe government. Even among influential opinion makers there is hardly any support for 
admitting the existence of a territorial conflict or of a shelving agreement. Even more 
conciliatory statements on this subject are rather vague. Japan Business Federation Chairman 
Hiromasa Yonekura mentioned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the government 
should be more flexible since otherwise its stance could be taken to mean that Japan has no 
intention of solving the dispute.280 Miyamoto Yuji, the former Japanese ambassador to China, 
is quoted as saying that ‘The government does not need to alter its basic position, but in 
reality, a conflict does exist over the Senkaku isles’.281 This is also the stance which the 
previous Japanese ambassador Niwa Uichiro takes in an article after his return.282 
 
5. The Regional and International Context 
5.1. Negative Implications Arising from fhe Regional and International Context 
There is a series of international circumstances which make a resolution of these opposing 
territorial claims difficult because of their precedent-creating implication. Japan, and 
indirectly the international community, is basically faced with the fundamental question: how 
to deal with a rising power which, all of a sudden, demands a territory which has, at least 
according to modern international law, legally been acquired and peacefully controlled 
without being challenged by any other country for over 70 years?  
The inherent zero sum nature of a territorial conflict demands great efforts to reach a 
compromise. China’s claim and modus operandi raises a fundamental challenge to the 
structure of the international system as well as to the widely-agreed modalities of solving 
territorial disputes. China has been questioning the territorial status quo in Asia (even leaving 
aside for the moment the unfinished civil war between the Communist and Guomindang 
leaderships over Taiwan) not only in case of the Senkaku Islands, but also in the case of the 
South China Sea. The modalities of resolving the territorial dispute in the East China Sea, as 
well as its outcome, will have implications for the various territorial conflicts and unresolved 
EEZ borders between China and other claimants which are much weaker than Japan. China 
has not yet resolved the delimitation of its EEZ borders with Korea or Japan, which is causing 
tensions and has already resulted in casualties and injuries. China’s use of rather contested 
asymmetrical political-economic-military means is challenging the role of international law 
for settling disputes peacefully. If might turns out to be right, it would set dangerous 
precedents not only for the other disputes in the East and South China Sea, but worldwide. 
Japan is responding to these circumstances by trying to rely even more on closer military 
cooperation with its American military ally, engaging in regional political power balancing 
(for example, establishing closer links with India, Vietnam and Myanmar) and soliciting 
political support from around the world. It is demonstratively supporting Vietnam and the 
Philippines’ efforts to protect their maritime security, because they are most concerned about 
the outcome of the Senkaku problem in view of their own territorial conflicts with China in 
the South China Sea. These moves, as well as Japan having become more vocal in demanding 
                                                          
280
 “Yonekura urges flexibility by Japan over Senkakus”, NHK, 28 September 2012, at 
www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20120928_36.html.  
281
 “Ex-ambassador to China calls for Senkakus talks”, Japan Times, 27 September 2012, at  
www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120927f4.html. 
282
 Niwa, Uichiro: “Nitchu gaiko no shinjitsu”, Bungei Shunju (February 2013), pp. 120-131. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 32 (Mayo / May 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
56 
a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes, are naturally resented by China and 
have unclear implications for the resolution of the Senkaku dispute.  
The regional context puts considerable pressure on Japan not to be seen as ceding to 
Chinese pressure, particularly after the 2010 and 2012 crises. China cannot fail to see a 
similar precedent value. Other pressures preventing a compromise arise from the US promise 
that the security guarantee of Article 5 of the Japanese-American Security Treaty applies also 
to the Senkaku Islands, although the US takes no stand on the sovereignty issue and Article 5 
does not imply an automatic US military involvement. If Japan compromises its 
administrative rights over the Senkaku Islands in a deal with China, it would risk these US 
guarantees, and cast a shadow over the whole bilateral relationship as well. For the supporters 
of the Japan-US military relationship, the dispute has become a test case for the security treaty 
while they fear at the same time that the US will use Japan’s reliance on the US to extract 
from Tokyo more military burden sharing, force it to find a resolution to the relocation of US 
forces on Okinawa, and draw Japan even more into the growing US-China rivalry in Asia.283 
At the same time there are doubts whether the US would really risk war with China over the 
islands, doubts which are stirred by Chinese commentators.284 The US is torn between its 
desire to develop a politically positive and economically lucrative relationship with China, 
and its reflexes aim at maintaining its military preponderance in Asia. At the same time it 
needs Japan, for the latter but does not want to have its relationship with China further 
complicated by Japanese-Chinese tensions. For example, the US announced on 19 December 
2012 that it planned the deployment of F35 stealth fighters in Iwakuni, at the same time it 
insists on a diplomatic solution of the island dispute. 285 During the preparations for Prime 
Minister Abe`s visit to the US in February 2013, it was reported that the US does not want to 
openly welcome Abe`s intention to allow collective defence or to have Obama call for 
Chinese restraint in the territorial dispute because of concern about China`s negative 
reaction.286 These dynamics of Japan’s eternal US dilemma of entrapment versus 
abandonment do not facilitate a territorial compromise. 
The position of Taiwan in the Senkaku Islands conflict is another complicating regional 
factor. Taiwan’s claim to the islands is framed by the importance of the American support for 
its security from the PRC (which, in conjunction with Taiwan’s fishing interests around the 
islands, also constrains the vigour with which it can confront Japan on this issue), its domestic 
politics dynamics (the current ruling Guomindang government being more assertive in 
claiming the islands than the opposition Democratic Progressive Party), its will to represent 
the ‘All China interest’ without simultaneously being seen to act in unison with the PRC, and 
the need not to be forgotten in what is a dispute mainly fought between Beijing and Tokyo. 
As we have seen above there have been clashes between the coast guards of Japan and 
Taiwan in the area of the Senkaku Islands because of Taiwanese support for protesters and 
fishing vessels from Taiwan. Such intrusions by Taiwanese protesters are bound to continue.  
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The strongest domestic force is, however, the fishing industry which has traditionally 
been active in the Senkaku area, while this has always been less the case for the PRC fishing 
industry. Taiwan has been urging Japan since 1996 to conclude a fisheries agreement, and 
only on 10 April 2013 a compromise was found to bridge deep differences over the 
delimitation of their overlapping EEZ. The implementation of this private sector agreement 
will still need further negotiations on rules and on the delimitation of parts of Japan`s EEZ 
around the Senkaku Islands (the territorial waters around the islands are excluded). It seems 
that Japan finally relented in order to prevent Taiwan-PRC cooperation against Japan while 
Taiwan was keen on getting access to the rich fishing grounds around the Senkaku before the 
start of the new season.287 It is doubtful that this `unofficial` agreement will be a model for an 
agreement between Japan and China and may instead make a compromise even more 
difficult. The PRC has several times protested the agreement because it undermines Beijing`s 
negotiation position and strengthens Taiwan`s international position.288 It is also worth noting 
that the local fishing industry in Okinawa is against giving Taiwanese fishermen access to the 
waters around the Senkaku Islands.289 
5.2. International Arbitration 
Since all the above analysed dynamics point to a repetition of crises with a growing risk of 
clashes between the law enforcement agencies if not the military, there seems to be only 
international arbitration which could help to find a way out of the impasse of the two rigidly 
entrenched and diametrically opposed territorial claims. However, there are strong 
countervailing forces on the Japanese as well as Chinese, and even structural problems with 
international arbitration. 
Since Japan considers that there is no territorial problem, consecutive governments have 
refused to take the issue to international arbitration. Within the Gaimusho it seems that the 
legal department has been the most decisive force in refusing international arbitration. 
However, according to a now-retired ambassador, about half of the Gaimusho staff in the 
1970s was in favour of putting all three Japanese territorial conflicts (Senkaku; Takeshima, 
Northern Territories) to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but the Treatise Bureau was 
against it.290 So far Japan has only been willing to take the Takeshima/Dokto territorial 
dispute to international arbitration but South Korea refused three times (1954, 1962 and 2012) 
when Japan officially suggested it.291 It does not look very convincing that Japan gives the 
impression of wanting to apply international law in an à la carte fashion, i.e. it favours it in its 
territorial dispute with South Korea where the latter is in de facto control of Takeshima, but 
takes a passive position in the case of the Senkaku dispute. The reason given for its passivity 
in the case of the Senkaku issue is the concern that approaching the ICJ would be interpreted 
by China that there is a territorial dispute.292  
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Which judicial forum would be appropriate? The dispute settlement mechanism of 
UNCLOS is not applicable here because it is only relevant in case of the interpretation or 
application of issues contained in the Convention (e.g. sea boundary delimitations) which 
excludes territorial disputes. This leaves the possibility for Japan and China to seek a decision 
by the ICJ or any agreed international arbitration panel. Unfortunately, China refuses judicial 
settlement by the ICJ and other international arbitration, and agrees in general only to 
international arbitration in non-political areas such as trade.293 
It is therefore very doubtful that China would unilaterally, or together with Japan, call 
upon international arbitration. Since China`s legal argumentation is rather weak, and a 
negative judgement could have implications for China`s legal claim to most of the South 
China Sea, there is even less of a chance for China making an exception for the Senkaku 
dispute. The most recent case of China rejecting international arbitration is its reaction to the 
Philippines’ unilateral move in January 2013 to ask the UN for arbitration concerning the two 
countries’ overlapping jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea.294 
Other circumstances related to the mechanics of international arbitration also cast some 
doubt on this approach. It may seem the best solution but as Ramos-Mrosovsky warned, `the 
unpredictability of litigation, the probable domestic illegitimacy of any adverse result, and the 
lack of any means short of force to enforce a judgment all work to discourage litigation or 
arbitration`.295. One can also add the long time it takes to get a result, which may be too long 
to hold back the domestic forces which want to pre-empt a negative result, particularly if 
natural resources are at stake and the dispute is so much linked to historical grievances and 
animosities.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The first part of this paper discussed the validity of the claims by both sides to the legal title 
to the Senkaku Islands and the question whether Japan and the PRC agreed in 1972 and 1978 
to shelve the conflicting territorial claims to the islands, and if they did so, why this 
agreement fell apart.  
In terms of modern international law, Japan seems to have the stronger arguments 
because of its consistent and unchallenged control over the islands and the failure of 
successive Chinese governments to publicly claim the title to the islands between 1895 and 
1971, and particularly after 1945.However, timing, decision-making process and secrecy of 
Japan`s territorial acquisition, as well as the amorphous transition at the end of the 19th 
Century from a China-dominated East Asian Order to one dominated by Western international 
law somewhat puncture the political and moral foundations of Japan`s incorporation of the 
islands. But even if the document of incorporation of the islands was made public by Japan 
only in 1952, it must have been known by successive Chinese governments that Japan was in 
control and Japanese citizens partly living on and commercially using the islands. At the same 
time, the timing and circumstances of the Chinese claims (i.e. by the People’s Republic as 
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well as the Republic of Taiwan) at the beginning of the 1970s cast suspicions on the motives 
behind their belated claims as former Prime Minister Zhou Enlai hinted himself in 1972. 
William B. Helflin, an international lawyer, therefore concluded his discussion of the issues 
arising from the historical and international law circumstances by writing in 2000 that `Under 
a variety of different guises, Japan has maintained authority over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
for over a century. Although historically inequitable, Japan appears to have a more persuasive 
case merely by its peaceful and continuous exercise of authority over the islands, which China 
did not timely protest`.296 
The US occupation of Okinawa included explicitly the Senkaku Islands. During the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the US and Britain referred to Japan’s ‘residual sovereignty’ 
over Okinawa. According to the US official position, the reversion of Okinawa to Japan’s 
sovereignty in 1972 transferred only Tokyo’s administrative rights over the Senkaku Islands, 
but this event opened for the first time the door to public sovereignty claims by the ROC and 
the PRC. To what extent these arrangements are congruent with international law needs still 
some research. The ROC government argued that security considerations against the 
background of the Cold War and its confrontation with the PRC explained its silence over the 
Senkaku Islands until then. The demands for the Senkaku Islands’ return to the ROC 
government, which also claimed to represent the whole of China, as well as the report in 1968 
about the likelihood of major hydrocarbon resources in the area, certainly played a role in the 
PRC’s belated claim to the island in 1971. Rather than clarifying its stance on the Senkaku’s 
legal title, the US opportunistically left it in 1972 to the contesting parties to decide, while 
implicitly reinforcing Japan’s claims by stating that the Senkaku Islands enjoy the same 
security protection under the bilateral Security Treaty as the rest of Japan. This could hardly 
be called a neutral position, as Henry Kissinger appropriately noted. 
The following unofficial and undocumented agreement between Japan and China to 
shelve the dispute helped for a considerable time to keep it under wraps. From the available 
evidence, it is indisputable that Japan and the PRC agreed in 1972 and again in 1978 to set the 
territorial dispute aside. This was politically understandable because both sides had other 
more urgent issues to address, and normalizing diplomatic relations and concluding the Peace 
and Friendship Treaty, respectively had the highest priority for both sides. In 1972, the 
greatest problems were how to deal with the Taiwan issue and the burden of history 
(reparations; apology), and, in 1978, how to deal with China`s demand for a joint front against 
the Soviet Union (anti-hegemony clause). However, this agreement had a congenital defect 
because it was never integrated into a public or agreed document, it never got legal force and 
any side could therefore deny it at any time. Although both sides never conceded their 
sovereignty claim, shelving of the dispute could be achieved for a considerable time because 
China did not challenge Japan`s effective control over the islands while the Japanese 
government exerted restraints in taking any measures which China would interpret as 
unacceptable acts of sovereignty (e.g. not allowing prospection for hydrocarbon resources or 
limiting access to the islands). The fundamental conceptual problem with the bilateral 
understanding of shelving the dispute was the assumption that the conditions allowing its 
creation and continuity in the 1970s could be frozen for as long as it would take until a 
solution to the opposing territorial claims could be found. The conclusion from the author’s 
analysis suggests, however, that maintaining the conditions for the continued reliance on the 
bilateral understanding would have demanded much greater efforts by both sides to maintain a 
good overall relationship and to clarify what the status quo is and what measures would be 
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seen as violating the status quo. Instead, various changes and dynamics in the domestic and 
international environment were allowed to, and later even instrumentalized, gradually erode 
these conditions. As can be seen from the above analysis, it is difficult to pinpoint a date 
when this process of erosion started, or an individual measure taken which set it off because 
of the accumulative nature of this process and the political aggregation of it.  
The appearance in the Senkaku Island waters of around 100 PRC fishing ships, some of 
them armed and with banners claiming Chinese sovereignty in April 1978 was brushed away 
by the Deng Xiaoping regime`s promise that this would not happen again. The general survey 
conducted in 1979 and the subsidized erection of a memorial monument during Prime 
Minister Ohira`s cabinet was certainly not in the spirit of the shelving agreement but did not 
lead to more than Chinese protests. The 1992 Chinese law on the territorial waters was 
definitely one turning point, as can be seen from the Chinese policy-making process as well as 
the political packaging when China tried to negate the law’s revisionist implications by 
denying any change of the Deng Xiaoping statement of shelving the territorial dispute. Even 
Japan`s official reaction at the time tried to play down the impact of the Chinese law. Later 
Japan reciprocated with its own series of administrative measures which affected the disputed 
islands against the background of a worsening bilateral relationship after 1992. By 2008, 
when the Chinese started sending patrol vessels into the territorial waters of the islands, the 
shelving agreement was all but dead. Both sides have therefore to carry the blame for letting 
things get out of control in an age of rising nationalism in both countries (albeit of a higher 
order in China) and interventions by non-state or local government actors. 
The fishing trawler incident in September 2010 marked a serious aggravation of the 
territorial conflict because China took offence at Japan’s detention and indictment of a trawler 
captain who was accused of twice ramming Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the territorial 
waters around the Senkaku Islands. The handling by the Japanese authorities was 
accompanied by statements about dealing with the incident according to Japan’s laws, as well 
as repetitions of the denial of any shelving agreement or the existence of any territorial 
conflict. China reacted to this reassertion of Japanese sovereignty over the islands by a series 
of unprecedented political and economic sanctions and retributions which forced the Japanese 
government to release the captain unconditionally. This crisis made a solution of the territorial 
conflict more difficult, and was bound to lead to the next crisis which happened in September 
2012 when the central government bought three of the islands from its private owner in order 
to pre-empt a purchase by the anti-China oriented governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro. 
Further research will have to elucidate beyond the author’s own speculation why 
communication between Japanese and Chinese authorities about the well-meant prevention of 
a purchase of three islands by the Tokyo mayor went so terribly wrong.  
The ensuing demonstrations in many Chinese cities, the Chinese official rhetoric, and 
Chinese retributive measures in the political, economic, law enforcement and military spheres 
have been even more unprecedented than those in 2010 and are hardly congruent with the 
conduct between nations which had concluded a Peace and Friendship Treaty. The linkage to 
Japan’s past aggressions against China by calling its position on the disputed islands `an 
outright denial of the outcomes of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and a grave 
challenge to the post-war international order` contradicts past official Chinese appreciation of 
Japan’s peaceful development after 1945. So far, China has demonstrated through its 
incursions into the Senkaku Islands’ Contiguous and Territorial Waters, as well as into their 
airspace, that Japan no longer enjoys full control over the islands. Denying the existence of a 
territorial conflict by Japan has become increasingly unconvincing, and appears like a refusal 
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to deal constructively with the confrontation. In contrast to the confrontation in 2010 it is still 
unclear what exactly the Chinese want to achieve and where a new compromise can be found. 
In a way, both sides are at the same time too vulnerable as well as too strong, to allow 
much room for a compromise. China feels vulnerable because it is faced with an apparently 
insurmountable territorial status quo (which Japan is perceived as reinforcing to its benefit) 
and its actions are under close international scrutiny because of the danger of conjuring the 
`China threat` perception. This vulnerability is well hidden in the following comment by Ye 
Xiaowen in the China Daily: ‘China's adherence to its peaceful development path is not to 
persuade, please or cheat anyone in the world, nor is it because China fears any other country. 
China has proposed "shelving the dispute and carrying out joint development" while claiming 
its sovereign rights over the islands, which demonstrates its restraint and tolerance. But if a 
country mistakes China's restraint for weakness, it is making a serious misjudgment’.297 
Moreover, at least for some Chinese analysts the island dispute is a means to undermine 
`America`s strategy of suffocating China and of reshaping regional dynamics to benefit 
China`.298 This ambiguity of China`s position makes it difficult for example to evaluate the 
full intentions of the government - beyond tactical manoeuvering - behind the invitation of 
several high ranking Japanese politicians with pro-China reflexes to China in January 2013, 
the cancellation of trilateral Japan-China-Korea summit and ministerial meetings, or the 
toning down of the anti-Japan rhetoric. If M.T. Fravel is correct about his assumption that a 
weakening bargaining power in a territorial dispute creates an incentive to use force in order 
to prevent a further decline of bargaining power, then the current confrontation could lead to 
bloodshed.299 
Moreover, China perceives Japan as weakening and its own political, economic and 
military strength rising. The new leadership is bound to continue for the time being the severe 
Japan policy of its predecessors until it feels firmly in power. Moreover the new Chinese 
president, Xi Jinping, is much closer to the military than his predecessor. 300He has been a 
member of the Leading Group on Maritime Security since August 2012 and thus involved in 
the issue directly.301 China is also able to mobilize considerable diplomatic capital for its 
claim, be it sowing doubts about US support of Japan or building a `United Front` with South 
Korea by accusing Japan of historical revisionism in the case of the Senkaku as well as 
Takeshima islands. 
Japan is worried about China’s bullying and does not want a repetition of being seen as 
ceding to Chinese pressure as in October 2010. It fears China’s ‘salami tactics’: if it gives in 
now, will China demand Okinawa next? Or will China proceed arbitrarily with the 
exploitation of the oil and gas resources in the East China Sea without waiting for an 
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agreement on the delimitation of the EEZ borders? But Japan also feels itself too strong for a 
compromise because it is in a comfortable position as status quo holder with effective control 
over the islands (although diminishing by the week), it tends to overrate China’s economic 
dependence on Japan, and it is being assured by the security guarantee of the US. 
The question is whether any Japanese government – in the face of unprecedented 
Chinese pressure - can get the balance right between either relying too much on the Japan-US 
Security treaty and its own defence efforts, or a creative comprehensive China policy which 
makes use of all of Japan’s political, military and economic strengths. Abe declared in his first 
news conference as prime minister in December 2012 ‘I recognize that the first step in turning 
Japan's foreign and security policy around is reinforcing our kizuna — our bonds of friendship 
— once more under the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is the cornerstone of Japanese foreign 
policy’.302 He has several times since denied the existence of a territorial problem and 
announced strengthening of Japan`s military and defence cooperation with the US. This 
would indicate that the former is unsurprisingly the default option. Moreover, given his 
revisionist stance on issues related to the history issue, there is not much optimism warranted 
for an incident-free management of the territorial issue, let alone a solution. Abe or his 
successor(s) as well as the Chinese leaders will have to find a new bilateral `understanding` 
which hopefully takes into consideration the lessons from the circumstances which led to the 
demise of the 1972/1978 `shelving consensus`. However, such a new consensus risks being 
less favorable to Japan`s current territorial position, while giving sucour to those arguing the 
`China threat` theory. 
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